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ABSTRACT 
Human error is a significant contributing factor in a very high 
proportion of civil transport, general avaition, and rotorcraft 
accidents. Finding ways to reduce the number and severity of human 
errors would thus appear to offer promise for a significant improvement 
in aviation safety. Human errors in aviation tend to be treated in 
terms of clinical and anecdotal descriptions, however, from which 
remedial measures are difficult. to derive. Correction of the sources of 
human error requires that one attempt to reconstruct underlying and 
contributing causes of error from the circumstantial causes cited in 
official investigative reports. Relevant measurements based on a 
comprehensive analytical theory of the cause-effect relationships 
governing propagation of human error a~e indispensable to a 
reconstruction of the underlying and contributing causes. This report 
presents the technical details of a variety of proven approaches for the 
measurement of human errors in the context of the national airspace 
system. Primary emphasis is on unobtrusive measurements suitable for 
cockpit operations and procedures in part- or full-mission simulation. 
Procedure-, system performance-, and human operator-centered 
measurements are discussed as they apply to the manual control, 
communication, supervisory, and monitoring tasks which are relevant to 
aviation operations • 
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SECTION I 
INTRODUCTION 
Findings by the Flight Safety Foundation, the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, and others indicate that human error is at least a 
major contributing factor in a very high proportion (80 percent or more) 
of civil transport, general aviation, and rotorcraft accidents. Finding 
ways to reduce the number and severity of human errors would thus appear 
to offer great promise for a significant reduction in accidents and 
improvements in aviation safety. 
The proportional involvement of human errors in aviation accidents 
has been relatively stable in spite of many changes in the air traffic 
control system and typical cockpits. This does not necessarily mean 
that an irreducible minimum has been reached, however. Instead we 
appear to be on a plateau in understanding the quantitative details of 
just how the human elements contribute. To make a significant dent in 
error reduction requires a better appreciation for the sources and 
causes of human errors as they affect the total aeronautical transporta-
tion system structure. 
Human errors in aviation tend to be treated in terms of clinical and 
anecdotal descriptions, however. For a more concrete identification of 
the sources of human error, one must strive to separate original under-
lying and contributing causes from the circumstantial causes cited in 
official investigative reports. Furthermore, if one is to attempt 
correction of the sources of human error, their cause-effect relation-
ships must be better quantified and classified. 
Meaningful quantification and classification requires a sound under-
lying and unifying foundation in terms of mathematical models which 
subsume existing evidence, permit the planning of experimental measure-
ments, guide the interpretation of results, and serve as the basis for 
extrapolation of results to other circumstances. Reference 1 was pre-
pared to fulfill this need for a sound foundation. 
TR-1156-2 1 
Reference 1 presents a validated analytical theory of input-output 
behavior of human operators involving manual control, communication, 
supervisory, and monitoring tasks which are relevant to aviation opera-
tions. This theory of behavior, both appropriate and inappropriate, 
provides an insightful basis for investigating, classifying, and quanti-
fying the needed cause-effect relationships governing propagation of 
human error. 
Based on the human error classification scheme, Ref. 1 identified 
sources and/or origins of human error in the context of human input-
output behavior. The concepts were illustrated by a typical task analy-
sis as an example of the approach required for identifying sources of 
human error among critical skills. In this report we now discuss the 
technical details of a variety of approaches for the measurement of 
human errors in the context of the national airspace system with primary 
emphasis on cockpit operations and procedures in part- or full-mission 
simulation. First, in Section II, the general types of measurements 
implied by the theory of human error are described. These, in general, 
are needed to identify and, in lesser or greater detail, to quantify the 
human's errors and error-free operations. Because realistic behavior 
depends so strongly on simulation system factors, the degree of simula-
tion required is addressed next. Section II closes with suggestions for 
steps to follow in planning effective measurements to reveal human error 
in part- or full-mission simulation. Section III takes up in more 
detail specific aspects of the procedure-centered evaluation of human 
error based on the typical task analysis from Ref. 1. Section IV then 
elaborates on system-performance centered evaluation and Section V, on 
operator-centered evaluation of human error. Section VI concludes this 
report by summarizing the recommended measurements. References and two 
supporting appendices follow Section VI. 
Let us begin with a commentary on the state of affairs regarding 
simulator measurements. In general, without focusing on human error, 
per se, the quantitative measurements which are routinely made during 
aircraft simulations are woefully inadequate or at best very limited in 
their scope. Seldom do measurements go beyond statistical manipulation 
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of certain basic vehicular states and controls or the mere gathering of 
time histories which reflect overall system performance. And.usual1y 
the only measurements of any direct value to the experimenter are the 
pilot ratings or pilot commentary. What is nearly always lacking is a 
measurement which quantifies the actual or effective pilot behavior, 
i.e., the functional response to simu1us, and a concise measurement 
which quantifies the overall man-machine system response latency or 
bandwidth in command following and disturbance regulation. 
As a result of not having made effective simulator measurements, we 
still find ourselves not really knowing or understanding in clear quan-
titative terms how pilots fly aircaft, make decisions, cope with stress 
or workload, and develop skills within the context of the national 
airspace system. lU thout effective quantitative measures in these 
areas, it is therefore not possible to make quantitative measurements of 
human error ___ if one cannot quantify correct behavior, then one cannot 
quantify incorrect behavior. 
It should be made clear that we are, in fact, capable of making 
effective measurements in the simulator environment. It is just not 
done comprehensively on a routine basis. Every simulation has its own 
very limited objective, and good measurements might be made in support 
of that objecive. But usually no measurements are made beyond that. 
This approach is not acceptable in viewing human error. 
The philosophical view which is promoted in this report is to strive 
to use a wide variety of measurement techniques in connection with the 
NASA Ames Research Center Man-Vehicle Systems Research Simulator Facil-
ity. This is justified by the large time and resource investment in the 
full-mission simulation approach. 
The trick is to make measurements sufficiently unobtrusive that they 
do not interfere with the experiment or the operation of the simulator 
facilities. This is probably the main reason for the popularity of 
routine statistical and pilot opinion measurements. In general, more 
sophisticated measurement techniques interfere with the subject in some 
way (e.g., many psychophysiological measures), impede progress of the 
TR-1l56-2 3 
experiment (getting special paraphernalia ready for use), or require 
excessive computation or computatio~al capacity (e.g., various parameter 
identification approaches). We shall be sensitive to these aspects in 
discussing various approaches. 
Another underlying idea in much of what is presented concerns the 
timeliness of reduced data and measurements. Simply stated, it is 
better to evaluate results as they are generated than after the fact in 
order to 
Detect and correct experimental flaws 
Truncate or extend the period of simulation 
Accelerate the reporting process 
Debrief subjects more effectively 
Establish the status of learning or training with more confi-
dence 
Discover unforeseen results earlier. 
The approaches presented and discussed herein tend to support this basic 
notion. 
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SECTION II 
MEASUREMENTS FOR IDENTIFYING HUMAN ERROR 
Measurement of human errors requires identification procedures that 
will take into account such characteristics of human behavior as adapta-
tion and learning. Through adaptation the human operator changes his 
behavior to achieve system performance in a new environment, whereas by 
learning he changes his behavior in successive encounters with the same 
environment. Because change itself accompanies human error, we there-
fore need measurements which help to identify sources and distinguishing 
characteristics of human error apart from adaptation and skill develop-
ment. Such measurements must, in themselves, not alter the behavior 
which would otherwise be adopted, and are therefore additionally quali-
fied as "non-intrusive" measurements. 
Reference 1 recommends in Section IV a basis for the classification 
of the sources and distinguishing characteristics of human error. 
Section IV of Ref. 1 is reproduced herein as Appendix A for convenience 
in referring to the definitions, sources, and causes of human error 
which need to be identified. The classification scheme is founded on a 
theory of human error. This theory is designed to aid in planning, 
conducting, and interpreting research on the common sources of human 
error Wh~ch may underlie the ostensible causes and factors given by the 
clinical lists in Section III of Ref. 2 and the anecdotal descriptions 
in Ref. 3. 
A. TYPES OF ERRORS AND DISTINGUISHING MEASUREMENTS 
Prerequisite examination in Appendix A of the definitions, sources, 
and causes of human error which need to be identified leads us to 
suggest the preliminary arrangement of distinguishing measurements in 
Table 1 for further consideration herein. Notice that a particular 
measurement may be capable of identifying more than one type of error. 
For this reason interpretation of a variety of measurements of effects 
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Basic Sources of Error 
(from Ref. 1 ) 
Extreme command or disturbance 
amplitude 
Extreme command or disturbance 
bandwidth 
Controlled-element change 
Reduced attentional field in 
single channel operations 
Diverted or divided attention 
and perceptual scanning in 
multi-input operations 
Reversals 
Illusions, kinetosis 
Spontaneous improper actions 
TABLE 1 
MEASUREMEN'r8 FOR IDENTIFYING HUMAN ERROR 
Groups of Distinguishing Measurements 
System Performance-Centered Procedure-
Measurements Operator-Centered Measurements Centered Measurements 
o'et-S ~et-S o'p.n CIl t:1 ~ 0 ~ t<.1 Ol-d II>C+S ...,-tIl ~t-=l 
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on the system of concern as well as on operator behavior may be required 
to identify a particular source or type of error in practice. In this 
respect the additional clues provided in Tables 9 through 11 in Appendix 
A may be especially useful in helping to interpret what we shall term 
system-centered and operator-centered measurements. Tables 12 and 13 in 
Appendix A are designed to assist in the even more difficult problem of 
identifying causes of error leading to inappropriate organization of 
perception and behavior at the executive level of the operator's 
actiVity-supervising control, transcending the (operator's) various 
directly involved systems such as the perceptual, cerebrospinal, 
autonomic and neuromuscular systems about the behavior of which 
particular measurements can be made. 
B. PLANNING FOR NON-INTRUSIVE MEASUREMENTS 
IN THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Experimental design must recognize beforehand the kinds of data 
interpretation which are desirable for identifying errors and should 
select the appropriate level of simulation, viz., either full-mission or 
part-mission in the case of the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility. 
Some advantages and disadvantages of each level of simulation, in part 
from Ref. 4, are offered here. 
1. Part-Mission Simulation 
Part-mission simulation offers economy by virtue of its ability to 
focus on a particular flight segment (e.g., letdown, approach, and 
landing) without spending simulator, crew, or experimenter time on 
portions of the flight (e.g., cruise) of lesser interest or in which 
fewer errors might be expected. Repeated simulation runs by one crew or 
an ensemble of simulations involving many crews become quite feasible. 
The possibilities for improper execution of the myriad of normal and 
emergency procedures within a particular flight segment can be examined 
in more detail in advance, simply because the volume of alternative 
possibilities is reduced by comparison with that volume in full-mission 
TR-1l56-2 7 
simulation. Thus one is more likely to be prepared with the necessary 
alternative details for more efficiently comparing and judging the 
discrete activities to detect procedural errors. 
In a single run, procedures, behavior, and performance for all the 
tasks involved are characterized by specific concrete actions (or inac-
tions) flowing in a sequence. Error is identified as an extreme devia-
tion from a desired state. With many replications these concrete ac-
tions exhibit variability, either in kind or in degree. A probabilistic 
framework for particular events then becomes appropriate as a means of 
describing the experimental data. In addition, the potential tradeoffs 
(based on experience and training) involved in selecting various emer-
gency actions can be exposed in the light of a utility concept (Ref. 1). 
However, there are drawbacks in part-mission simulation. One of 
these drawbacks is associated with the influences of motivation, re-
hearsal, and skill development. Operator experience with each a~peri­
mental situation must be controlled if meaningful comparisons are to be 
made. This, in turn, may compromise the realities of crew motivation. 
In addition, if each operator is to have experience with several types 
of controls and displays in sequence, the possibility of differences in 
performance depending upon Which specific system was used immediately 
preceding must be considered. These carryover effects are particularly 
difficult to handle because no simple experimental or statistical tech-
nique exists for eliminating their influence on the results of a part-
mission study. 
Critics of part-mission simulation also like to cite the difficulty 
in establishing the validity of the pre-experimental environmental 
conditioning of the subjects, especially when terminal flight segments 
of a long term mission are involved. The identical elements theory of 
transfer of Thorndike will be cited to challenge the surrogate pre-
experimental conditions Which are required to induce fatigue, boredom, 
and complacency. This disadvantage can be more effectively countered by 
turning to full-mission simulation. 
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2. Full-Mission Simulation 
The face validity of full-mission simulation, with its potential 
ability to duplicate the entire flight environment and the entire demand 
on the flight crew, is attractive and compelling because it offers an 
opportunity to capture the motivational subtleties residing in crew 
coordination and resource management which might contribute to human 
error and Which might be overlooked (or not even duplicated) in part-
mission simulation. Furthermore full-mission simulation would presum-
ably allow the effects of fatigue, boredom, and complacency to exert a 
more realistic influence on vigilance and human error in terminal seg-
ments of the flight. These advantages were realized in the prototype 
full-mission simulation reported in Ref. 5. 
Full-mission simulation is not without significant disadvantges, 
however. Reference 4 recognizes that crew training requirements are 
very substantial, especially if the cockpit procedures, controls, and 
displays being tested are not those to which the crew members are accus-
tomed. For example, on-site flight instructors may be required to 
transition flight crews to an advanced technology cockpit prior to any 
full-mission simulation, if substantive errors are to be reduced to a 
level comparable with that toward which commercial air carriers are 
supposed to strive. Thus full-mission simulation of advanced technology 
operations implies a concomitant investment in air carrier crew transi-
tion training and certification, which can be very significant. 
For procedure-centered human error data and other low probability 
events such as accidents, we can depend on full-mission simulation only 
for anecdotal and qualitative evaluation as in Ref. 5. Any statistical 
measures of confidence in procedural errors and other low probability 
outcomes would require months of accumulated experience at enormous 
cost. The outlook is much more favorable, however, for acquiring sta-
tistical measures of confidence in certain system-centered and operator-
centered parameters from short-term temporal ensembles where the ergodic 
hypothesis is reasonably valid. 
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An example of the compact on-line efficiency with certain system-
centered and operator-centered parameters can be measured from short-
term temporal ensembles is shown in Fig. 1 for an approach and landing. 
In addition to the customary time histories of system state variables, 
systen-centered measures such as bandwidth (exemplified by gain cross-
over frequency, wCFD ), and relative stability (exemplified by phase mar-
gin, $ ) provide time histories which can serve as event markers of 
mFD 
changes occurring in the man-machine system. Furthermore, operator-
centered measures such as the pilot#s describing function [exemplified 
by amplitude, lip (O.Sj) I ' and phase angle, 4 Yp (O.Sj), at a fre-
quency of O.S rad/sec] provide time histories which can serve as event 
markers of behavioral changes. 
C. STEPS IN PLANNING FOR MEASUREMENTS 
In order to provide a convenient checklist of some of the necessary 
prerequisites for careful planning of measurenents, we have prepared the 
outline in Table 2. This table not only summarizes some of the discus-
sion up to this point in the exposition but also serves as a reader#s 
guide for the remaining sections of the report which emphasize proce-
dure-centered evaluation in Section III, system performance-centered 
evaluation in Section IV, and human operator-centered evaluation in 
Section V. 
Of particular importance is the deliberate emphasis in Table 2 on 
performing essential steps in the pre-experimental analysiS. Planning 
data collection beforehand specifically for the anticipated data reduc-
tion and statistical analyses is a general requirement for studies of 
human behavior. A significant investment of time and effort beforehand 
will assure more productive results from the measurements obtained in 
the actual experiment. In addition to ensuring that the assumptions 
required for the analyses are met, consideration of the fiducial statis-
tical tests provides guidance in deciding how much data to collect. In 
some cases, evaluation of the power of a proposed test for detecting 
expected differences may lead to abandoning a measurement or even 
abandoning the experiment! 
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Figure 1. Time History on Final. Approach with Flight Director h1JD. 
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TABLE 2 
STEPS IN PLANNING FOR MEASUREMENTS IN THE 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Establish purpose, scope, and scenario 
Elect part- or full-mission simulation 
Specify mission phases, events, environment 
Organize responsibilities, procedures, tasks for each crew 
member within each mission phase delineated by events 
Specify inputs, types of activity (e.g., cognitive or 
psychomotor), outcomes and outputs associated with each task 
Perform essential pre-experimental analysis 
Prepare activity time line analyses for normal and emergency 
operations together with likely alternatives for procedural 
errors which are foreseen 
Classify non-intrusive measurements for the purpose of 
identifying errors 
TR-1l56-2 
Procedure-centered evaluation based on time-sequences of all 
variables and events 
System performance-centered evaluation 
Command-following bandwidth or latency and critical 
exceedences 
Disturbance regulation bandwidth or latency and critical 
exceedences 
Safety; operational capability (distributions of state 
variables) 
Human operator-centered evaluation 
Pilot acceptance (distributions of state and control 
variables) 
Temporal averages of task-specific dynamic behavior 
among crew members 
12 
,. 
,. 
,. 
~ 
TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Subjective ratings - appropriate workload indices for 
full-mission simulation 
Objective workload correlates 
Psych~physiological correlates } Useful for part-task simulation 
(Note that objective workload correlates are useful for 
"calibrating" subjective ratings and psychophysiological 
correlates are useful event markers) 
Eye point of regard: useful for event'markers, temporal 
and ensemble distributions of attention 
Define measurement support and structure organization, and 
specify formats and media for output variables to be measured 
and recorded 
Discrete outputs, events 
Continuous signals to be sampled 
Continuous signals without sampling 
Closed-circuit video 
Audio communications 
Hard copy (e.g., subjective ratings and observers' notes) 
Estimate likely parameter values for proper and improper 
execution of activities within normal and emergency procedures 
Dry run portions of experiment and refine measurement techniques 
Specify output variables to be fitted by distributions from 
which probabilities can be estimated for the purpose of safety 
analysis verification and for interpretation in terms of 
decision analysis and workload analysis 
Manage and monitor data acquisition during experiment 
Check against pre-experimental analysis 
Look for measurement deficiencies 
Keep up to date with as many on-line measurements as possible 
TR-1156-2 13 
TABLE 2 (Concluded) 
Relate measurements to commentary and observations 
Post experimental analysis 
Analyze interrelationships among 
Procedure-centered measurements 
System performance-centered measurements 
Operator-centered measurements 
Identify or postulate sources of human error 
Perform planned statistical analyses (if any) and update 
hypotheses 
Refine behavioral models 
Recommend improvements to measurement procedures 
Organize and present results 
General recomendations 
Treat data as archival 
Acquire as much numerical definition as is practical (may be 
limited by storage and non-interference requirements) 
Do not restrict data acquisition to the narrow objectives of the 
experiment; it may serve someone else 10 years hence! 
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. A final point in the design of experiments for studying human error 
in using controls and displays involves a logical problem that is re-
strictive and, perhaps for that reason, frequently overlooked. When 
control-display systems being compared differ in several characteris-
tics, there is no possible way to conduct a single experiment and draw 
valid conclusions about which of the several differences in the controls 
and displays is responsible for any observed differences in system or 
operator performance. All that may be concluded is that the collection 
of differences in control-display design resulted in differences in 
performance. Identification of a single feature of a design as respon-
sible for a difference requires measurements with systems in which only 
the single feature of interest is changed. 
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SECTION III 
PROCEDURE-CENTERED EVALUATION 
In Ref. 2 we noted the numerical predominance in Table 1 of proce-
dural, supervisorial, planning, and communication/navigation/ identifi-
cation (CNI) errors, which also appeared among the last four entries in 
Table 4. In-cockpit procedures; supervision of checklists; ATC clear-
ance, communication, and bookkeeping; navaid selection; use of change-
over points; and reporting to ATC for navigation on various airways/ 
route systems occupy a significant portion of the pilots' time, espe-
cially in areas of higher traffic density. Most of the errors identi-
fied by Ref. 5 are in these categories. Reference 5 has already cited 
the problems of handling the inordinate volume of documentation required 
in the cockpit to support these types of activities. Just handling this 
library in the cockpit is a monumental task, notwithstanding the respon-
sibility for complete familiarity with an incredible array of proce-
dures. These problems are compounded by the inefficiency of voice 
communication among crew members within the flight deck as well as 
between the flight deck and the ground facilities having jurisdiction 
over the flight. This inefficiency may lead to procedural errors and 
temporal latencies in discrete events and in stimulus-response relation-
ships involving not only cognitive processes but also more than one 
human operator. Consequently we have adopted the suggestion that 
"'slips' at the precognitive level, either from faulty activation of 
schemata or faulty triggering of active schemata," may also be an im-
plicit source of error underlying many of the cited causes w~ich involve 
a procedural error as well as a flying error, even though "spontaneous 
improper action" appears explici tly in Table 1 of Ref. 2 only wi th rank 
10(a) and in Table 4, not at all. 
Measurement techniques are well-developed for identifying sponta-
neous improper actions, provided the sequences of tasks and actions 
necessary for mission success and failure have been thoroughly planned 
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and defined at the outset of an experiment. Such careful pre-experi-
mental identification of procedures, both proper and improper, provides 
a framework exemplifying the spatial-temporal facets of the mission 
phase event- or time-line which are essential to the recognition and 
interpretation of "slips" at the precognitive level of operational 
behavior. The necessarily thorough pre-experimental definition of 
procedures was applied in Refs. 4 and 5, but in Ref. 5 the details of 
recording discrete actions such as setting switches or levers, respond-
ing to check lists, or coping with emergencies were relegated to an 
. observer's commenting on a voice recorder, coupled with voice records of 
all flight deck communications. Since retrieval of "slips" from voice 
records is both tedious and cumbersome, as well as subject to the addi-
tional interpretation of the observer and participant, it is preferable 
to institute automatic recording of discrete actions by the crew members 
wherever possible. Thereafter to detect "slips" it is possible to 
employ automatic comparison of the recorded time-line of discrete ac-
tions wi th the pre-experimentally recorded time-line of "normal" and 
"emergency" procedures established for the scenario. 
Our starting point for establishing a time-line of "normal" and 
"emergency" procedures for the scenario is the vehicle operational 
profile (or mission profile). To accomplish this essential pre-
experimental planning, the mission is first defined and partitioned into 
a hierarchy of constituents. The primary constituents are mission 
phases. These are of a size and duration which allow the broadest 
factors (e.g., environmental variables) that influence human behavior to 
be identified. For example, if the mission phase be "approach and 
landing," our starting point is represented by Block 1 in the procedural 
diagram, Fig. 2. From this point of departure three categories of 
variables must be determined, viz., the procedural variables (i.e., the 
functions to be performed) in Block<Z), the task variables in Block®, 
and the environmental variables in Block®, all of which exert an 
impact on the inputs to the man-machine system of concern. (We shall 
defer consideration of Block ® to Section IV, where we discuss system-
centered evaluation.) At the next level are the tasks, per se, in 
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Block~ which are associated with a particular operation in a sequence 
and are sized to permit the identification of "critical" skills. Aber-
rations in the execution of these skills ultimately determine the sour-
ces of contributions to human error. 
A mission phase may be broken down into various subdivisions depend-
ing on its complexity. For our purposes here, we are ultimately inter-
ested in the elemental unit of all phases involving the human operator, 
the task. As a working definition here, we will define a task as ~n 
activity at the functional interface of the human operator and the 
objects and environments with which he interacts (Adapted from Ref. 
6). We will further specify a task, for our purposes here, as a goal or 
criterion-oriented work increment involving application of a skill or 
set of skills by the human operator. Thus, by partitioning the mission 
phases into tasks, we can then identify those fundamental human operator 
behavioral factors, skills, which influence flight safety. For tasks 
which are critical to flight safety (i.e., exert a predominant influence 
in some sense), it is the proficiency with which a skill or set of 
skills is applied that we wish to consider in order to identify the 
underlying sources of human error. 
To illustrate these remarks, Table 3 and its companion Fig. 3 (from 
Ref. 1) present an exemplary task breakdown for the pre-approach, ap-
proach, and landing mission phases of a Category 1 or 2 instrument 
approach. The tasks include checklists, tuning radios, requesting and 
receiving clearances, navigating as required by ATC procedures, etc., as 
well as flying the airplane. Each task is listed as an item in an 
ordered, nominal sequence. Conceivably this order might be changed or 
omitted in off-nominal circumstances, and this by itself may be a cause 
of error. Otherwise, no consequence of an erroneous execution of a task 
is explicitly indicated on the list. 
Associated with each task are input and output modalities for the 
pilot (or other active crewmember). And, finally, with each task is an 
indication of the human behavior characteristics nominally involved in 
carrying out the task at hand. In many cases the nominal behavioral 
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TABLE 3 
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Figure 3. Sequence o"f Tasks Per"for:o.ed During Approach and Landing 
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characteristics may not be exhibited by actual crews, and this abnormal 
behavior may result in an out-of-tolerance system error. 
In most of the tasks where precognitive operations are cited in 
Table 3 as nominal or customary, additional qualification is necessary. 
Such open-loop operations are normally of limited duration and are 
properly interspersed or concluded with closed-loop operations either 
directly, as in dual mode continuous control, or indirectly in the 
context of the off-line supervisory monitor described in Fig. lOa of 
Ref. 1. Omission of the closed-loop monitoring activity may in fact 
lead to human error as shown in Ref. 7. Examples are: tuning communi-
cations, navigation, and identification (CNI) equipment; selecting 
partial flaps; lowering gear; setting throttles; dumping fuel; and 
accepting ATC clearances which are either physically impossible or 
unsafe. To emphasize this point, some of the precognitive operations in 
Table 3 are accompanied by compensatory operations. The nature of the 
control and display interface with CNI equipment in particular will also 
determine whether channel frequency selection can be purely precognitive 
or must include compensatory verification. 
For the measurement of human error, the nominal task breakdown 
illustrated here must be further subdivided to account for all possible 
outcomes. This is illustrated in Section V of Ref. 1 for the terminal 
end of the approach and landing mission phases. Other off-nominal 
aspects which should be considered are the accumulation of stress and 
degradation of skill. Each mission phase presents a combination of 
environmental and task stresses on the crew, and these stresses influ-
ence crew performance. After lapses in operational practice or in long 
duration flights, crew members have to cope with the problem of main-
taining proficiency of skills which may be critical to flight safety. 
Skills performed infrequently prior to or during each flight, for what-
ever reason, are most likely to fall into this category. Of these' 
skills, those having high workload factors by virtue of being time-
constrained or because they involve compl~~ operations are most likely 
to cause serious performance decrements. Several conditions may con-
tribute to the degradation of these skills: 
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1) Lack of practice. 
2) Inability to practice in the appropriate envi-
ronment. 
3) Interference or negative transfer arising from 
the practice of competing skills. 
4) Physiological deconditioning due to fatigue 
induced by the environment or due to alcohol or 
drug stresses. 
The tasks which are most likely to be affected by these human conditions 
should be especially flagged. 
Most of the points made above have an intuitive appeal as well as a 
logical structure. This overall structure has been outlined here to 
provide an example showing the tying-together of elements into a whole 
which provides the necessary pre-experimental identification of normal 
and emergency procedures, both proper and improper. These procedures, 
in turn, provide a basis for identifying human errors among the recorded 
time-lines of discrete actions by crew members in a full mission simula-
tion. Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order about the use and 
abuse of pre-experimental time-line analyses, which can be carried to 
the point of diminishing returns. For example, it is customary to 
estimate latencies and operator task "loading" from procedural time-line 
analyses. Conventional time-line analyses for estimating latencies and 
workloads suffer from several shortcomings. Accurate estimates of times 
required for the intangible elements of activities such as direction of 
attention, memory, and decision making are generally not available, and 
even the vague estimates are generally based on textbook descriptions of 
operator behavior in performing discrete tasks. But flight safety is 
not necessarily a function of operator performance as described in 
textbooks. Catastrophic events are precipitates of the interaction of 
very rare events (external and/or psychological) that may coincide 
capriciously in time. One cannot necessarily list the tasks required 
sequentially of an operator, add time allotments up to the 99th percen-
tile, and show thereby that the job can be done acceptably. Instead, 
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discrete outputs and events usually provide the most useful benchmarks 
for establishing on-line measures of decision-making behavior. To 
establish a system latency (time for an "input" to propagate through the 
multioperator system) the "input" may, in the case of cognitive tasks, 
have to be considered to be present if and only if all of the informa-
tion (based on continuous and discrete signals available) which is 
needed to derive the "input" as a conclusion to be acted on is present. 
When the realities of pilot behavior under boredom or high stress 
are included, plus the contingencies in task requirements that depend 
upon prior timely execution of related tasks, the cost and complexity of 
extremely detailed pre-experimental task analyses may become unreason-
able. Notwithstanding this word of caution, at least the level of 
detail illustrated in Table 3 will be necessary in order to detect 
procedural errors by comparison with a recorded sequences of discrete 
actions among crew members. 
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SECTION IV 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE-CENTERED EVALUATION 
System performance-centered measurements can be divided into two 
categories: those which reflect design quantities and those which 
reflect design qualities. Design quantities include the dynamic system 
performance (relative stability, accuracy, closed-loop bandwidth or 
speed of response in command-following, and disturbance regulation) as 
well as the physical characteristics of the system. Design qualities 
may also be quantified and include safety, pilot acceptance, operational 
capability or effectiveness, reliability, maintainability, and cost. 
These measurements apply to automatically controlled aircraft and their 
subsystems; to control-display subsystems involving one or more human 
operators; and to communications, command, and control systems involving 
two or more operators. However, because a single measure cannot quant-
ify both system and operator performance and because we are unable to 
express either operator acceptance or the reliability of the human 
operator in terms commensurate with the design qualities of equipment, 
it is necessary to introduce a variety of related qualities that charac-
terize human operator compatibility, e.g., behavior adaptation*, learn-
ing, workload, stress, fatigue, motivation, and pilot opinion rating. 
An "optimum" system is one that has some "best" combination of all of 
these features. 
* Through adaptation the human operator changes his behavior to achieve 
system performance in a~ environment, whereas by learning he changes 
his behavior in successive encounters with the same environment. In 
terms of pilot behavior the improvement of system performance implies 
reduced effective time delay; reduced pilot-induced noise insertion 
(unwanted control action); increased allowable range of pilot gain vari-
ation consistent with closed-loop system stability; progression above 
the compensatory level in the successive organization of perception 
through skill development; and reduced workload to a level where the 
pilot is efficiently and gainfully occupied, yet able to cope to a 
prescribed degree with the unexpected. We shall devote Section V to a 
consideration of measurements which reflect human operator-centered 
evaluation in more detail. 
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Our starting point for establishing system performance-centered 
measurements is a vehicle operational profile. For the example of 
approach and landing, this is represented by Block CD at the top of 
Fig. 2. Examples of operational profiles are given in Fig. 1, Table 3, 
Fig. 3 (from Ref. 1), and Fig. 4 (from Ref. 114). 
A. FREQUENCY DOMAIN MEASURES 
Based on the operational profile, we have already noted in Section III 
the need to determine the task variables (Block QD ) and procedural 
variables (Block CD ) which support communications, navigation, identi-
fication, command (guidance), and control functions (Block ~ ) re-
quired by each phase of the scenario for normal and degraded operations. 
The design requirements for these functions are in turn dictated by four 
needs the first three of which are conveniently characterized by fre-
quency domain measurements: 
o Stability 
o Command-following bandwidth Block@ 
o Disturbance regulation bandwidth 
o Compatibility with the hucan operator Block@ 
The satisfaction of these needs leads to the selection, sensing, shap-
ing, and relative weighting of appropriate feedbacks in Step ~ and to 
their partition between manual and automatic systems. The relative 
degree of stability can be characterized by measuring phase or gain 
margins of stability, the closed-loop system bandwidth, and speed (or 
latency) of response in command-following and disturbance regulation. 
The relative ease with which phase margin and system bandwidth measure-
ments can be made is illustrated by their respective time histories 
identified during the simulated approach recorded in Fig. 1. These 
measures are fundamental to any closed-loop system and are independent 
of whether control is automatic or partitioned among several human 
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Figure 4. Representative Example of a Scenario (From Ref 114) 
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operators. For example, when measuring system bandwidth or system 
latency*, and cognitive tasks are involved, the "input" may have to be 
considered to be present only when all of its necessary constituent 
info rmation is present, because the "input" may then and only then 
derive as a conclusion to be acted on. 
B. SYSTEH ERROR MEASURES 
1. Individual Event Outcomes 
Based on the operational profile, a list of the outcomes of the 
approach and landing phases of flight is also developed. This step is 
represented by Block ~ in Fig. 2, and a sample is provided by Table 15 
in Ref. 1 and by Table 4 herein. Typical values for the critical limits 
for a subsonic jet transport are given in the appendix to Ref. 8. 
Analogous limits for a STOL aircraft are given on p. 115 in Ref. 9. The 
critical limits, in turn, are based on data from a variety of sources 
such as FAA Advisory Circular 20-57 on Automatic Landing Systems, ap-
plicable flight handbooks, and aircraft geometric, structural, and 
aerodynamic linits. Other limits that reflect acceptability of the 
approach and landing can be incorporated in similar evaluation criteria. 
For example, Ref. 10 suggests criteria for judging measured attitude and 
heading angles and normal acceleration on automatically controlled 
approaches. Margin from stall and the maximum rate of descent, both of 
which become more critical to the pilot as the approach angle steepens, 
should also be measured. Ref. 11 suggests analogous criteria for judg-
ing measured control displacements and rates. Critical limits such as 
these are represented in Bock ~ in Fig. 2. System performance is 
examined in Block ~. Proceeding in this manner, we can express in 
commensurate terms the performance criteria by which accomplishment of 
* Latency = time for an "input" to propagate through the (multioper-
ator) system. 
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~ MISSION 
SEGMENT 
Transition to 
missed approach 
configuration 
or to engine-
out takeoff/ 
climb config-
uration 
Timed approaches 
from a holding 
fix to parallel 
runways (see 
Fig. 4) 
115 approach 
TABLE 4 
TYPICAL PERFO~~NCE METRICS 
PRINCIPAL FORCING 
FUNCTIONS 
Configuration changes 
to establish trimmed 
transition flight 
path, path command, 
gusts 
Leader's maneuvers, 
gusts, terrain, 
potential lateral 
and vertical 
conflicts 
Beam bends and 
glide slope 
scalloping, gusts, 
wind shear 
PERFO&~ANCE METRIC 
Settling time, ITAE, rms 
motion variables, probability 
of exceeding control limits, 
pilot activity (control axis 
crossings) 
RMS deviation from desired 
position, probability of 
collision, exceeding con-
trol limits, or striking 
the ground, pilot activity 
(control axis crossings) 
Settling time, ITAE (for 
beam capture), rms motion 
variables, pilot activity 
(control axis crossings), 
probability of exceeding 
limits on position and 
sink rate at terminal time 
A definitive treatment system performance criteria in both the time and 
frequency domains is given in Refs. 122 and 123. 
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the approach and landing (or other mission segment) will be measured and 
the penalties associated with errors in system performance. 
Having specified critical limits for the approach/landing outcomes, 
we can determine the individual approach/landing outcomes by comparing 
the measured values of the pertinent state variables with their corre-
sponding critical limits which represent system performance criteria. 
The steps required are represented by Blocks @ and ® in Fig. 2. 
As an example, in Ref. 8 a wind-shear model is used to determine the 
quantitative relationship between acceptable mean deviations (glide 
slope, d, localizer, y, and airspeed, ua ) at 100-ft altitude and at 
touchdown. These relationships are windows in "state space" that have 
the dimensions (dlOO ' alOO ' ualOO) and (Y100' Y100)' respectively, for 
the longitudinal and lateral situations. 
2. Ensembles of Event Outcomes 
Proceeding in this manner we can alternatively express in commensu-
rate probabilistic terms the performance criteria by which accomplish-
ment of the approach and landing (or other mission segment) will be 
measured and the penalties associated with errors in system performance. 
Having specified critical limits for the event outcomes in Block ~ 
(and @ ), we can compute in Block 0 ampli tude and frequency distri-
butions of ensembles of state variables and control variables which 
define the outcomes of interest. From these distributions outcome 
probabilities can be inferred. The results represented in Block ~ are 
probabilistic measures of the approach and landing outcomes such as 
those in Table 3 and of system acceptance in terms of attitude and 
heading deviations from trimmed values, normal accelerations, and con-
trol displacements and rates. 
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C. MEASURES OF SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 
Finally in the step represented by Block ~ in Fig. 2, the results 
from Block ~ are used to compute measures of safety and operational 
capability such as the expected number of approaches required to land, 
given an arrival in the terminal area (safety); the expected number of 
accidents, given an arrival (risk); and the minimum average time between 
landings (operational capability or effectiveness). 
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SECTION V 
HUMAN OPERATOR-CENTERED EVALUATION 
As in the case of system performance evaluation, our recommended 
starting point for establishing operator-centered evaluation criteria 
and corresponding measurements is a vehicle operational profile. For 
purpose of illustration, consider again the example for approach and 
landing in Table 3 and Fig. 3. The approach and landing profile in-
cludes several distinctly different classes of procedural variables as 
represented in BlockGDin Fig. 2. These include (i) visual-motor track-
ing of guidance references (flight control); (ii) discrete tasks, such 
as following checklists, making configuration changes (e.g., flap and 
gear extension), and routine communication, navigation, and identifica-
tion (CNI) tasks; (iii) decision-making CNI tasks such as responding to 
ATC advisories or intrusions, and failure management such as coping with 
a partial loss of propulsion, compensating for a failed yaw-damper, or 
deciding to take over manual control of an axis; or (iv) the use of 
other perceptual-motor modalities such as verbally calling out altitudes 
during an approach. The diverse examples cited illustrate that there is 
no single type of operator-centered evaluation criterion and measurement 
which covers all of the operating procedures. 
Measures of system performance, safety, and operational capability, 
coupled with other design qualities such as cost, reliability, and 
maintainability, might be sufficient for evaluating a completely auto-
matic system. However for a piloted system, experience has show~ that 
many other factors are involved in the ultimate assessment of sources of 
error. This is because measures of system performance, safety, or oper-
ational capability are insufficient for measuring pilot performance. 
For example, among different approach course tracking systems, the pilot 
may adapt his behavior so that an overall system performance measure 
remains relatively invariant and, therefore, unsuitable for inferring 
anything about pilot performance. Consequently, it is necessary to 
recognize and attempt to measure the operator-centered variables that 
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reflect sources of human error, namely, adaptability, learning, 
perceptual-motor workload, stress, fatigue, motivation, and pilot 
opinion rating (Block QJD in Fig. 2). Because these operator-centered 
variables are so important, we shall discuss psychomotor behavior 
techniques in the following subtopic (A) and present a t~~onomy of 
psychomotor behavior measurement in the next subtopic (B) and follow 
that with a discussion of measuring human response to a change in the 
task in Subtopic C. 
Nevertheless, some system performance measures are important factors 
in pilot acceptance and may thereby cont·ribute to errors in judgment. 
These include variances of attitude, attitude rate, load factor, and 
control activi"ty. Any of these, if too large, will lead to some degree 
of pilot dissatisfaction and possibly even pilot error. 
Another system performance consideration related to pilot acceptance 
and errors in judgment is the harmony between manual and automatic con-
trol for systems that can operate in both modes, but in somewhat differ-
ent manners. For example, in aircraft equipped with direct lift control 
or a collective control, the automatic system may conduct the landing 
maneuvers in a different fashion from the pilot. Under automatic con-
trol the flare may be a nearly constant-attitude maneuver, with sink 
rate reduced by direct lift control. The same aircraft under manual 
control may require rotation to flare. Such lack of harmony between the 
aircraft motions in manual and automatic operation makes the pilot's 
monitoring more difficult. Although it is known to be a significant 
factor in pilot acceptance, we currently do not have a good quantitative 
appreciation for motion harmony requirements, so this factor will remain 
qualitative until further research is conducted. 
A final important criterion for pilot acceptance is the pilot work-
load required to perform an approach and landing. Several pilot work-
load measures and testing techniques are discussed subsequently in Sub-
topics D and E. 
This completes our introduction to this section. We shall now con-
sider the subject of psychomotor behavioral measurement in more detail. 
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A. PSYCHOMOTOR BEHAVIORAL IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES 
The dynamic response characteristics of human operators are impor-
tant in a wide range of vehicular control situations. Psychologists and 
engineers have been studying specific tracking control situations for 
years and have found the human operator to be highly adaptable to a wide 
variety of machine dynamics. The use of systems analysis techniques 
together with dynamic response models of the human operator has tended 
to coalesce much of the apparently diverse and irreconcilable data, and 
provided a valuable construct for both system design and analysis. The 
dynamic response models of the human operator used in systems analysis 
activities have also proved to be extremely useful guides in designing 
man-machine experiments and defining relevant measurements of dynamic 
response performance (see Ref. 12). 
The value of understanding pilot psychomotor behavior lies in the 
ability to predict results for a variety of conditions rather than rely-
ing on the demonstrated performance for a single set of conditions. 
This comes about as a result of defining the pilot's overall input-
output behavior rather than just the explicit output performance. 
With regard to human error, knowledge and specification of nominal 
behavior provides a basis for quantifying departures from such behavior, 
i.e., errors. For example, Ref. 13 reports the detection of a head-up 
display flight director tracking mistake as a result of monitoring a 
running estimate of the pilot's flight director-to-column transfer func-
tion. The pilot, following a minor distraction, began tracking the 
wrong symbol in the display. This was only a momentary error, and the 
* pilot detected it himself. But the incident did register clearly in 
the psychomotor behavioral measurements. 
Another motivation for psychomotor behavioral identification is the 
simple fact that its frequent alternative, pilot performance measurement, 
* The measurements also detected other types of errors committed by 
(but not mentioned by) some of the pilots. We shall illustrate and 
discuss the errors detected subsequently. 
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is often ambiguous. A given measured level of pilot performance can 
correspond to various combinations of: 
o Pilot workload 
o Controlled element response 
o External disturbance level 
o Displayed information. 
In a general sense, to define psychomotor behavior is to define the 
input-output transfer relationships between all vehicle states (in the 
various ways they are perceived) a~d the various vehicle controls. This 
can be a formidable procedure, but there are some reasonable, feasible 
approaches. 
The prime difficulty in attempting to measure psychomotor behavior 
is the understandable reluctance to hypothesize a behavioral model which 
then must be quantified experimentally. It is far easier and far less 
risky simply to measure and report the resultant pilot-vehicle perfor-
mance, e.g., tracking error statistics. Quantification of behavior re-
quires the experimenter to know what are the significant stimuli, the 
ways in which controls are functions of the stimuli, signficant noise 
sources, and the accompanying role of vehicle dynamics. 
A complete survey of psychomotor behavioral measurement techniques 
and methods is well beyond the scope of this study. Much has been pub-
lished under the heading of human operator identification and far more 
under the general heading of system identification. A few survey docu-
ments include Refs. 14-18. All we shall attempt to do is to outline a 
useful taxonomy of measurement approaches and to discuss what features 
are important to the measurement of human error. This effort is based 
on review of psychomotor measurements and techniques reported by many 
sources. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the vast body of litera-
ture on this topic deals with single-loop control structure. Relatively 
few measurements have been made in a task-related multiloop cont~~t. 
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But a multiloop context is highly relevant to the consideration of human 
error, and we shall describe how to cope with this context in the next 
topic. 
B. APPROACHES TO PSYCHOMOTOR BEHAVIOR MEASUREMENT 
In discussing the subject of psychomotor behavioral identification, 
it is first helpful to consider, in a general way, the important fea-
tures of the identification process. A diagram of the general psycho-
motor identifi~ation process (or almost any identification process for 
that matter) is shown in Fig. 5. The central features are (i) the 
subject, (ii) the subject's stimuli and responses, and (iii) the model 
structure which reflects the psychomotor characteristics of the subject. 
The other features shown aid in producing a definition and quantifica-
tion of the model structure and include the disturbance input, identifi-
cation method, solution criteria, and search procedure. The interpreta-
tion of results is the means of conveying essential information to the 
experimenter. Each of these aspects will be discussed and followed by a 
discussion of what measurement features are most appropriate for simula-
tor studies of human error. 
1. A Taxonomy of Psychomotor Measurement 
a. Model Structure. An important step in defining a psychomotor 
behavior measurement approach for multiloop tasks is the choice of model 
structure. Without a definable, explicit model structure, there is no 
real basis for quantification of the stimulus-response functional rela-
tionships. The reticence of some investigators to hypothesize a model 
structure has blunted the interpretation and usefulness of many experi-
mental results. 
The model structure is simply the framework about which measurements 
can be quantified and organized. This framework can take on many forms 
and degrees of complexity, however. 
In general some kind of parametrical expression is needed in order 
to interpret, summarize, and compare results. However, parametrical 
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INTERPRETATION 
OF RESULTS 
features can be ~~pressed after having identified behavior in a non-
parametric form. For example. the results of using spectral analysis 
techniques to obtain human operator describing functions are expressed 
in a general frequency domain form (amplitude and phase) without 
reference to specific pilot behavioral parameters. Such results can 
then be interpreted in terms of summary parameters as stimulus-response 
amplitude and phase at a few specific frequencies of interest. 
The exact nature of parameters chosen to represent human operator 
behavior is an important issue. In the role of safety verification 
analysis. peak excursions or standard deviations in, say. altitude or 
airspeed are obviously important parameters in judging terrain clearance 
or stall safety margins. respectively. As for human error evident in 
psychomotor behavior, it was suggested in Ref. 1 that effective system 
* bandwidth for a particular task is a fundamental parameter. It can, 
for example, help to establish the level of successive organization of 
perception at which the pilot is accomplishing that task. Changes in a 
time history of effective bandwidth can also serve as both event mar~ers 
and error indicators. 
Other parameters which reveal pilot behavior in direct ways are: 
o Pilot's stimulus-response phase angle at or near 
the effective pilot-vehicle system bandwidth 
(this is an indication of lead compensation or 
anticipation and therefore workload). 
o Pilot's stimulus-response gain at or near the 
effective system bandwidth (if evaluated as a 
function of time or specific events this can be 
an indication of appropriate adjustnent to chang-
ing conditions). 
o Non-zero crossfeeds or feed forward actions which 
coordinate controls in various special tasks 
(this can be a direct indication of pursuit or 
precognitive behavior as opposed to strictly com-
pensatory). 
* Gain crossover frequency is a convenient measure of system bandw~dth. 
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Perhaps the most fundamental division in model structure is between 
structural isomorphic and algorithmic models (Ref. 19). 
An isomorphic structure refers to having a form much like that of 
the human operator or the operator's organizational structure. 
Isomorphic can apply to neuromuscular, sensory, and equalization func-
tions such as shown in Fig. 6 (from Ref. 19). Taken on a larger scale, 
it can also apply to a basic task-dependent loop structure as demon-
strated in Figs. 7 and 8 for two common aircraft maneuvers. 
The algorithmic psychomotor behavior structure supplies (e.g., 
Fig. 9) the various organizational units which are, in turn, identified 
or measured by any suitable identification method ___ parametric or non-
parametric, time or frequency domain. 
An algorithmic model structure is, in some ways, an abstraction of 
psychomotor behavior and is based on the notions of optimal control-
optimal estimation, i.e., modern control theory. Typically this form of 
model expresses the human operator's adaptive control (motor) behavior 
as an optimal controller which makes use of all system states and con-
trols in such a way as to minimize some form of cost function. Those 
state variables which are assumed to be perceived are operated on by an 
optimal estimation process (Kalman filter) in order to generate the 
needed states for the control process. Much success has been achieved 
with this approach as illustrated in Refs. 20, 21, and 22. 
Three areas of difficulty of the modern control theory algorithmic 
model approach regarding psychomotor behavior are given in Ref. 19. 
These are, briefly stated, 
o The human operator must contain essentially com-
plete knowledge of the man-machine characteris-
tics, i.e., be a complete internal model. 
Although this might be plausible at the precogni-
tive level of skill development, it is incompat-
ible with what we know about the compensatory 
level. 
o Identification from ~~perimenal data is diffi-
cult. 
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o A cost function appropriate to a particular task 
must be available. 
b. Identification Method. The identification method consists of 
the computational manipulation of basic stimulus and response data in 
order to quantify the model structure. The following general methods 
have been applied to human operator behavior measurements: 
Frequency 
Domain 
Time 
Domain 
* { Fourier analysis by FFT ! Cross-spectral analysis 
Variance analysis 
! Cross-correlation analysis Response error analysis Equation error analysis } 
Non-parametric 
Parametric 
As indicated, two broad kinds of classifications are (i) time versus 
frequency domain and (ii) non-parametric versus parametric. 
Fourier analysis has been widely used for measuring psychomotor 
behavior (e.g., Refs. 23 and 24). The attractiveness of Fourier methods 
stems from the capability they provide for making on-line FFT measure-
ments with high signal-to-noise ratio. The resulting describing func-
tions, error variance, relative coherence, and remnant are usually 
computed off-line. The method requires the use of prescribed sums of 
sinusoidal inputs to the pilot (error signal) and a know~ controlled 
element to compute finite Fourier transforms. The result is a spectral 
description of the pilot's response to a particular signal at several 
discrete frequencies. These data are then frequently fitted by an ef-
fective model structure in order to obtain specific values of effective 
neuromuscular delay, equalization, and remnant. 
Cross-spectral analysis requires only that various spectral and 
~ross-spectral density functions of the pilot's input and output signals 
be measured (Ref. 12). The cross spectra are computed with respect to a 
common signal, and thus the pilot's input-to-output describing function 
* FFT = Finite Fourier Transform. 
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is derived from the ratio of the input-to-output cross spectra so 
computed. References 25 and 26 provide good examples of applying the 
cross-spectral technique. One of the advantages of both Fourier analy-
sis and cross-spectral techniques is that they provide remnant spectral 
density as well as describing functions. One of the drawbacks to both 
the Fourier analysis and cross spectral methods, however, is that rela-
tively long run lengths in time are required to get good, low frequency 
data for describing functions. A discussion of this problem can be 
found in Ref. 27. 
Variance analysis is the most extensively used time domain method, 
but its value is limited. The most direct application is safety verifi-
cation analysis, i.e., estimating the probability of exceedence of nom-
inal limits such as with airspeed or flight path. Variances, per se, 
are not highly sensitive to changes in workload or psychomotor behavior. 
Although seldom used, some estimation of effective bandwidth can be 
obtained from one-half the null crossing frequency or from the ratio of 
rate variance to displacement variance, i.e., 
w2 
eff 
. 
0 2 
RATE 
= az-
DISP 
(Ref. 28) 
"Bandwidth" is a vague term unless the signal spectrum is rectangular. 
For other spectral shapes the dimensionless variability can be used to 
define a rectangular bandwidth equivalent, i.e., 
w 
i 
e 
= 
[f= ~ (W) dw]2 
o xx (ref. 29) J~ (~ (w)]2 dW 
o xx 
This is the bandwidth of a hypothetical rectangular filter which would 
pass a signal x with the same mean squared statistical error as the 
actual filter when the input is white noise. ~xx(W) is the power spec-
tral density of signal x, where the signal variance a 2 is defined as 
x 
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.. 
(12 
x = 
J'" 
o 
~ (W) dW 
xx 
Cross correlation analysis is a time domain method which has been 
used to describe non-linear, non-stationary weighting functions of a 
human operator (Refs. 30 and 31). 
Response error and equation error methods, also known as parameter 
trackers, have enjoyed much popularity in identifying inanimate systems 
and also appear useful in measuring human operator behavior. One of the 
key advantages of the response error and equation error methods, espe-
cially for identifying human error, is the aspect of revealing fairly 
abrupt changes with respect to a time-line of events by means of a short 
term averaging technique employing a sliding window. Reference 18 
treats these methods in a general way, but there are many variations 
(e.g., Refs. 32 and 33). One has the fr'eedom to adapt these methods to 
specific characterizations (model structures) of the psychomotor behav-
ior. More will be said about this subsequently. 
c. Command and Disturbance Inputs. Excitation of the pilot-vehicle 
system is essential for any type of psychomotor measurement. As men-
tioned previously, the human operator must be induced to interact with a 
simulation ___ to follow commands, to regulate against disturbances by 
closing loops or otherwise to perform required tasks. Commonly used 
command and disturbance inputs include both deterministic and random 
signals listed in Table 5. 
Some human operator identification schemes include a disturbance 
input which can be adapted as an integral part of the scheme. In the 
case of the describing function analyzer (DFA) (Refs. 34, 35, and 36), a 
sum of sine waves is .provided. It can be employed either as a disturb-
ance or as a command, and the operator's describing function at the 
sinusoidal frequencies can be computed quite directly from knowledge of 
the resulting control movement. In addition the remnant can be computed 
by the serial segments method (Ref. 37). 
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TABLE 5 
Ex&~PLES OF SIMULATED INPUTS SUITABLE FOR PSYCHOMOTOR MEASUREMENTS 
A. Random or quasi-random signals (unpredictable by definition) 
necessary for identifying compensatory level of skill development 
1. Representing forms of 
a. Atmospheric turbulence 
b. Radio guidance anomalies 
2. Alternative generating sources 
a. Continuous or discrete Gaussian stochastic signal sources 
b. Quasi-random sums of five or more sine waves 
B. Deterministic, but unpredictable signals --- necessary for identify-
ing possible transitions to levels of skill development higher than 
compensatory 
1. Representing forms of 
a. Discrete gusts 
b. Wind shear 
c. Radio guidance anomalies 
d. Intrusions Which lead to evasive action by pull-up or side-
step maneuvers 
e. Engine failures Which lead to abrupt moments and forces on 
the aircraft 
f. Cockpit warning and caution signals 
g. ATC commands, advisories, responses 
2. Alternative generating sources 
a. Transient signals, e.g., steps, pulses, ramps, versines 
b. Pseudo-random binary signals 
c. Voice commands, responses 
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C. Deterministic and quasi-predictable signals --- necessary for identi-
fying pursuit and precognitive levels of skill development 
1. Representing forms of 
a. Marker beacon signals, to/from signals, event markers 
b. Checklists 
c. ATC commands, advisories, responses 
d. Familiar features of terrain, especially on visual approach 
routes 
e. Moving maps and elevation profiles of routes 
f. PPI of relative motions of neighboring traffic and weather 
g. Pilot-induced oscillations 
h. Low frequency, lightly damped vehicle modes 
i. Optical landing guidance anomalies caused by ship motions in 
a coherent sea 
2. Alternative generating sources 
a. Single sine wave 
b. Sums of a few sine waves 
c. Narrow-band processes, in general 
d. Oscillators 
e. Event markers 
f. Voice commands, responses 
D. Deterministic signals which are useful as injected test inputs for 
identifying inanimate systems such as controlled elements 
1. Representing forms of 
Typical control and disturbance inputs 
2. Alternative generating sources 
a. Sum of sine waves (Ref. 23 and 34) 
b. Frequency sweep (Ref. 38,) 
c. Pseudo-random binary (Refs. "39 and 40) 
TR-1156-2 48 
Other measurement approaches may take advantage of disturbance in-
puts provided within the simulation, such as radio guidance anomalies, 
atmospheric turbulence, or wind shears. Whatever the generating source, 
one must be careful not to compromise realism (and thereby to compromise 
pilot motivation) when adapting the disturbance input to provide ade-
quate signal-to-noise ratio for the purpose of identifying describing 
functions and remnant over the desired measurement bandwidth. Sums of 
sine waves, in general, provide the superior signal-to-noise ratio 
essential for identifying remnant. Further discussion of the various 
sources of remnant can be found in Ref. 12. 
Some identification techniques will identify the inverse plant 
instead of the human operator When significant amounts of remnant are 
present (Ref. 41 demonstrates this phenomenon). The parameter model 
identification scheme, however, will still accurately identify the pilot 
even when large amounts of pilot remnant are present. This unique fea-
ture, along with other attributes of the parameter model identification 
scheme, are demonstrated in Ref. 13 where it is applied to a realtime, 
piloted simulation. Some selected results from Ref. 13 are contained in 
the next subsection. 
Further discussion of the identification of elements within a closed 
loop can be found in Refs. 12, 41, and 42. 
d. Solution Criteria. For any particular psychomotor behavioral 
measurement approach it is necessary to judge how well the identifica-
tion method has produced quantification of the model structure. 
According to Ref. 43, solution criteria can be classified as: 
Error minimization 
Likelihood approach 
Prediction error 
F-ratio 
These include the popular least squares and maximum likelihood criteria. 
The least-squares method is perhaps the most commonly used parametric 
identification method; see Ref. 14. Among its advantages are that it is 
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easy to apply, quick to use, and the calculations can easily be per-
formed recursively in the observed data. These advantages permit real-
time, on-line identification in a simulation environment (e.g., where 
the required data is in a high speed digital computer). The chief 
disadvantage of the least-squares method is that it does not permit 
modeling of the noise structure of the system, and that it gives biased 
estimates unless the noise structure is of a certain type. These prob-
lems have not been found troublesome, however, in the psychomotor meas-
ures of Refs. 13 and 44. 
The maximum likelihood method has been widely used in all types of 
system identification (see Ref. 16 for a partial list). The major 
limitation in connection with simulation is the need for considerable 
computational power. The advantage of the maximum likelihood method is 
unbiased estimates. However, it is more difficult to apply than the 
least squares method and requires much more computational power. 
e. Iterative Search Procedure. In some cases it is necessary to 
apply a search procedure in order to converge upon a solution to a given 
identification method. This is a technical matter which is of little 
concern here eKcept to note its role. In many identification ap-
proaches, a direct solution to model structure is possible, and a search 
procedure is unnecessary. 
Some of the search procedures which are available include: 
Manual 
PARTAN 
David on-Fle tcher-Powell-Levenberg 
Newton-Raphson 
Random 
Simplex 
A discussion of specific search procedures is beyond the scope of this 
report. 
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f. Presentation and Interpretation of Results. In order to appre-
ciate the results of psychomotor behavior measurements, the experimenter 
may need to examine more than just the numerical definition of whatever 
model structure is employed. For example, if the psychomotor model is 
in the form of several finite difference equation coefficients (i.e., 
time domain), then it may be useful to display an indication of fre-
quency domain quantities such as effective bandwidth or phase shift at a 
particular frequency of interest. (In fact, Ref. 44 demonstrates that 
the "raw" difference equation coefficients can behave very strangely 
under certain circumstances, but that frequency domain parameters are 
very well behaved.) Or, as an example of the converse, a non-parametric 
cross-spectral measurement might be better summarized in terms of an 
effective neuro-muscular delay or lead time constant. 
The point is that any basic behavioral identification scheme can be 
further manipulated to provide indications convenient to the experi-
menter. A particular model structure and identification method may be 
efficient thus permitting realtime computation and data reduction, but 
subsequent transformation to different terms may be of more direct 
benefit. 
2. Measurement Approaches Appropriate To Human Error 
a. Diverted Attention. Diverted attention from flying the aircraft 
and spontaneous improper actions are believed to be sources of human 
error underlying many of the cited causes in Ref. 2 which involve a 
flying error. Measurement techniques are highly developed for identify-
ing the role of diverted attention from flying the aircraft as a source 
of human error, provided the flying tasks for each phase of the mission 
have been carefully defined at the outset of an experiment. The most 
prominent effects of diverted or divided attention are to reduce the 
pilot gain and to increase remnant in the affected channels of attention 
for which psychomotor measurement methods have already been discussed. 
b. Spontaneous Improper Action. Measurement techniques are also 
well-developed for identifying spontaneous improper actions, provided 
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the sequences of tasks and actions necessary for mission success and 
failure have been thoroughly planned and defined at the outset of an 
experiment. Such careful pre-experimental identification of procedures, 
both proper and improper, provides a framework exemplifying the spatial-
temporal facets of the mission phase event- or time-line which are es-
sential to the recognition and interpretation of "slips" at the precog-
nitive level of operational behavior. The necessarily thorough pre-
experimental definition of procedures was applied in Refs. 4 and 5, but 
in Ref. 5 the det.ails of recording discrete actions such as setting 
switches or levers, responding to checklists, or coping with emergencies 
were relegated to an observer's commenting on a voice recorder, coupled 
with voice records of all flight deck communications. Since retrieval 
of "slips" from voice records is both tedious and cumbersome, as well as 
subject to the additional interpretation of the observer and participant, 
it is preferable to institute automatic recording of discrete actions by 
the crew members wherever possible. Thereafter to detect "slips" it is 
possible to employ automatic comparison of the recorded time-line of 
discrete actions with the pre-experimentally recorded time-line of 
"normal" and "emergency" procedures established for the scenario. 
c. Monitoring and Decision-Making Errors. With increased use of 
automatic controls and computers in modern day aircraft and traffic con-
trol systems, the role of the human operator is becoming more supervis-
ory, involving increased amounts of monitoring and decision making. In 
these roles, human outputs are typically discrete (as opposed to contin-
uous control actions) and include non-manual actions such as verbal 
communication. Monitoring and decision making errors can arise due to 
misperception of monitored information and misinterpretation of per-
ceived information. Errors can also occur in the more cognitive aspects 
of decision making where the operator must account for various possible 
consequences of the alternative actions available to him. Again, since 
retrieval of monitoring and decision-making errors from voice records is 
tedious and cumbersome, it is possible to employ automatic comparison of 
the recorded time history of discrete actions with the pre-experiment-
ally recorded time-line of normal and emergency procedures established 
b efo rehand fo r the sc enario • 
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Monitoring and decision-making constructs and viewpoints are useful 
in full mission simulations with a complete crew in several ways. 
First, human errors sometimes appear to be inexplicable when, for exam-
ple, only two courses of action are possible, and an operator appears to 
make the obviously wrong choice. By considering the elements of these 
task situations in a decision-making context one can gain additional 
insight into the underlying factors involved. Second, if specific ana-
lytic deCision-making models are reasonably appropriate descriptors of 
the mission phases being simulated, then the model can serve as a means 
for the analysis and interpretation of the experimental results. Third, 
a combination of monitoring, decision-making, and control viewpoints is 
essential in treating repeated simulation runs by one crew, or an ensem-
ble of simulations involving many crews. In a single run, behavior and 
performance for all the tasks involve specific concrete actions (or 
inactions) flowing in a sequence. Error is identified as an extreme 
deviation from a desired state. With many runs, these concrete actions 
often exhibit differences, either in kind or in degree. A probabilistic 
structure for particular events then becomes appropriate as a means of 
describing the experimental data. Further, the potential tradeoffs 
(based on experience and training) involved in selecting various emer-
gency actions can be exposed in the light of a utility concept. }!oni-
toring and decision making theories are appropriate for such considera-
tions. 
For simulations where a monitoring and decision making construct is 
likely to be useful, the experimenter must recognize this potential at 
the outset by appropriately structuring the experimental tasks, scena-
rios, and performance measures. Then, when particular models for deci-
sion making are .to be considered in data analysis, there may be further 
impact on the experimental design. 
In Ref. 1, monitoring and decision making are first presented from a 
conceptual point of view in order to identify the basic components of 
monitoring and decision making tasks that must be taken into account in 
simulation setup, selection of measurements, and experimental design. 
Analytical procedures for data analysis and modeling are then briefly 
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covered. In the most general approach to studying monitoring and deci-
sion-making behavior, the detailed structure of the operator's task may 
not be clear so that only very general data analysis procedures can be 
applied with any certainty. As more is understood about the operator's 
behavior, certain assumptions may be invoked to allow more detailed 
analysis and perhaps modeling of the operator's task. Reference 1 
concludes with an example to illustrate how a specific situation can be 
analyzed from a decision perspective to discover factors important in 
developing the appropriate experimental measurements to be made in a 
simulation. 
d. An Example Identifying Control Task Errors. Using the 
measurement taxonomy outlined in the previous subsection, the following 
approaches are recommended: 
Model structure- keep it as simple as possible 
While observing all significant features within 
the nominal piloting task. It may be necessary 
to make successive refinements, each more com-
plex, in order to settle on an optimum model 
structure. 
Identification method ___ time domain analysis may be 
more sensitive to revealing human error events 
than frequency domain analysis. One successful 
direct method using a specific isomorphic model 
structure is the least squares (equation error) 
parametric method described in Refs. 13, 41, 44, 
and 45. 
Disturbance inputs_ existing atmospheric turbu-
lence is capable of providing the needed distur-
bance but must be strong enough to predominate 
over pilot remnant. 
Solution criteria ___ least squares fitting using 
accumulated data is adequate. Non-stationary 
effects may be obtained by restarting identifi-
cation periodically or by dropping off old data 
as new data are acquired (sliding window con-
cept, Ref. 13; or fading memory, Ref. 32). 
Search procedure --- none is required for a least 
squares parameter method, per se, but it may be 
useful to carry along more than one model struc-
ture or identification method and to search for 
the best solution according to goodness of fit. 
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Interpretation of results ---make use of results in 
realtime if possible. Notify the experimenter 
about anomalies as soon as detected to signal 
possible human error events. Attempt to corre-
late subjective and objective, e.g., performance 
with effective bandwidth, workload with phase 
angle shifts, successive organization of percep-
tion with appearance of feedforward, or cross-
feed paths as well as with effective bandwidth. 
The time histories shown in Figs. 10 and 11 demonstrate how a pilot 
control strategy identification scheme can be used to identify and quan-
tify human error. The time histories were taken from a realtime, 
piloted simulation and represent a pilot controlling a conventional jet 
transport aircraft on final approach. In Fig. 10 the pilot was using a 
standard head-down flight director, and in Fig. 11 the pilot was using a 
flight path head-up display (HUD). The non-intrusive pilot identifica-
tion program (NIPIP) described in Ref. 13 was used to measure the 
.. 
pilot's control strategy (labeled as Y (jW) in Figs. 10 and 11) as well p 
as the bandwidth and phase margin of the combined pilot-vehicle system 
(labeled as Wc and ~ in Figs. 10 and 11). The bandwidth (which is 
FD mFD 
also called the crossover frequency) reflects how tightly the vehicle is 
being controlled. Higher bandwidths are desirable because the combined 
pilot-vehicle system is less responsive to external disturbances. To 
achieve higher bandwidths, however, requires higher workload by the 
pilot. The phase margin reflects the relative stability of the combined 
pilot-vehicle system (positive, zero, and negative values of ~m corre-
spond to stable, neutrally stable, and unstable systems, respectively). 
Reference 13 reports that the phase margin was particularly sensitive to 
changes in pilot control strategy and could be used to identify and 
quantify certain types of pilot error (specifically, errors in control 
strategy). Examples of this are shown in both Figs. 10 and 11). 
In Fig. 10 the pilot makes a "control reversal," which is labeled as 
Item 6 in the figure. That is, the pilot put in a pitch up command when 
the rate and position of the flight director called for a pitch down 
command. In Fig. 11 the pilot started tracking the wrong symbol in the 
HUD (specifically, the glide slope symbol instead of the flight path 
symbol), which caused the flight director to diverge. After a few 
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Figure 11. Time History on Final Approach 
Using Flight Path HOD with Flight Director 
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seconds, the pilot realized his error and made a large corrective con-
trol input. Both errors. were quantified by large and sudden changes in 
Yp (jW) and $m' Changes in the bandwidth and/or phase margin may also 
reflect other events such as pilot distraction or changes in pilot work-
load. Learning effects and skill retention are also quantifiable with 
bandwidth and phase margin. 
C. MEASURING HUMAN RESPONSE TO A CHANGE IN THE 
(CONTROL) TASK SITUATION 
Some of the most critical events in the context of both flight con-
trol and air traffic control will involve changes in the task situation 
or organization of pilot activity, particularly in failure management 
and other emergency situations. Critical control events typically 
involve a change in the task situation or organization of activity. 
This could consist of a planned event such as entering a terminal area 
and follOwing a Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR), or an unexpected 
event such as a system failure or system deviation. On the one hand, 
the required pilot activity could consist of: 
o 
o 
o 
o 
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Changes in the organization of manual control 
activity from compensatory to precognitive and 
back such as executing a side-step maneuver on 
final approach to parallel runways or pushing 
over to intercept the glide slope. 
Changes in the organization of manual control 
activi ty from compensatory t.o pursui t and back 
such as executing a Standard Instrument Depar-
ture (SID) or STAR with the aid of a moving map 
display. 
Manual control action such as taking over from 
an automatic system and continuing to fly the 
vehicle manually at a pursuit (rather than 
compensatory) level in the organization of 
perception. 
Monitoring and decision response such as switch-
ing to backup system from a primary system in 
response to a warning indicator or other dis-
played indication of emergency or failure. 
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On the other hand, the required traffic controller activity could con-
sist of: 
• 
• 
Issuing a procedural advisory about potentially 
conflicting traffic 
Commanding evasive action. 
In each case, task performance is strongly affected by the degree of 
expectancy and level of training and practice. For both types of activ-
ity within flight or ground context, the reaction times could be compar-
able (for similar stimulus levels). However, the initial decision and 
discrete switching or advisory action may solve the problem in the 
procedural task case, while continuous subsequent activity is required 
in the control case or command case. 
1. Change in the Organization of Manual Control Actions 
A graphic demonstration of how a pilot changes his organization of 
perception is contained in Fig. 11. The pilot is controlling a CTOL 
aircraft on final approach with the aid of the head-up display depicted 
in Fig. 12. The pilot is initially flying straight and level, and he 
must transition to a descending three-degree flight path angle and 
capture the glide slope. 
Note from Fig. 11 that by the time the pilot has reached the outer 
marker he has not yet performed the required transition. He has flown 
through the glide slope (viz., &G/S in the figure) and now the flight 
director, FDc' is commnding a large pitch down angle. The pilot does 
~, however, follow the flight director commands, as evidenced by the 
lack of activity in the control column, 0c. The pilot is probably 
perfonning a precognitive maneuver. He pulls back on the throttles (not 
shown in the figure) and pitches down in order to get the aircraft to 
descend, based on his knowledge of the aircraft dynamics. Thus, during 
the transition phase the pilot is monitoring or closing a very loose 
loop on flight path angle. When the aircraft gets close to the desired 
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Figure 12. S~lified Sketch of Flight Path HUn with 
Flight Director (Longitudinal kcis Only). 
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flight path angle the pilot reverts to compensatory tracking of the 
flight director with the control column. 
Note from Fig. 11 that compensatory Y is virtually zero during the p 
precognitive maneuver, but converges to a reasonable solution rapidly 
once the pilot starts tracking the flight director. This is because 
NIPIP was designed to measure the pilot dynamics in a compensatory 
tracking task only and not during precognitive maneuvers. It may be 
possible, however, to quantify this precognitive maneuver by examining a 
state space similar to the one used for modeling flare maneuvers 
(Ref. 43). 
2. Change in the Controlled Element 
Some research has been accomplished by STr (Refs. 47 and 48) and 
others (e.g., Refs. 49 and 50) in efforts to measure and interpret 
operator and system performance when there is a sudden change in the 
manually controlled element. Early work by Sadoff (Ref. 49) considered 
pilot control with pitch damper failures in a centrifuge simulator. 
These and other data were brought together by STI to obtain a model for 
interpreting the pilot's response to a task "transition" which contains 
four phases: 
• 
• 
o 
o 
Pre-transition steady state 
Post-transition "retention," where the pilot has 
not yet reacted properly to the transition 
Transition control, where the pilot may use 
large corrective control actions to stabilize 
the system and reduce large errors which may 
build up during retention 
Post-transition steady state 
The two middle phases are the key to transition performance. With high 
expectancy (transition probability) the retention time is short; and 
this might be the case during approach, while failures of the flight 
control system (FCS) during en route phases would be unexpected and 
result in longer retention times. 
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For difficult dynamic transitions, training is particularly impor-
tant. For example, in our studies (Ref. 48) skilled pilots completely 
lost control during the first 20 to 30 attempts to handle a severe 
control system failure, but after 200 trials their response was nearly 
time-optimal with very little perturbation in system error. The ques-
tion now at hand is: How does lapse in practice affect this highly 
trained state, and what type of reinforcement is required to maintain an 
adequate proficiency level? 
3. Monitoring Manual Control Actions 
The pilot using a flight director or automatic system for control 
wants to spend a certain amount of time monitoring the confidence-
inspiring situation information. This is how he gains and maintains 
confidence that all is going as expected. We speak of this time that he 
spends monitoring the situation information as his monitoring workload 
margin. It can be expressed either as a fraction of time, the dwell 
fraction, or as the fraction of the number of looks, the look fraction. 
Both the dwell fraction and the look fraction are obtained from eye 
point of regard (EPR) measurements, which are discussed subsequently in 
Subtopic E. 
Sufficient monitoring margin is essential for the pilot to perceive 
exceedence of tolerances or specified values related to the task. Most 
of the pilot~s status displays present the flight motion variables which 
are constituents of the automatic or flight director commands. Other 
status displays are common to engine or radar instrument monitoring, 
where the effects of manual control are not displayed. Still other 
status displays are common to traffic monitoring, where intervention for 
the purpose of control may be exceptional. This we shall call "ooni tor-
ing and decision response" as discussed previously. More about measur-
ing and interpreting this is presented in Ref. 1. 
One purpose of the research reported in Refs. 51 and 52 has been to 
improve the bases for interpreting and predicting the partition of the 
pilot~s time between the monitoring margin and the fraction of time 
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required for control. Estimates of average monitoring display threshold 
exceedence frequencies in terms of a level of pilot confidence in his 
situation, coupled with two conservation principles, viz., the conserva-
tion of look fraction and of dwell fraction, provide one basis for 
interpreting and predicting the partition of scanning workload for 
monitoring and control. The results of the partition provide estimates 
of the average scanning frequencies and dwell fractions for control as 
well as monitoring. The dwell fractions also represent the temporal 
probabilities of fixation. From these predictions, one can estimate the 
dwell intervals, look intervals, link values, and other scanning param-
eters desired (Ref. 53). 
The detailed development of a simplified approximate method for par-
titioning the scanning workload required for monitoring and controlling 
a task with a single primary director display is given in Ref. 51 and 
with ~ primary director displays in Ref. 52 for a STOL approach. The 
properties of the pilot's scanning remnant and properties of the parti-
tion of scanning workload may conspire to compromise the pilot's confi-
dence in his situation, to compromise his error performance, or both, so 
that his subjective impression of the overall task workload will be 
high. 
The methods discussed so far rely on measurements of the pilot's 
scanning remnant in order to account for the potential role of parafo-
veal and peripheral vision in controlling and monitoring (e.g., Refs. 54 
and 55). This is because one must be careful to distinguish between 
(measurable) eye movements and (unmeasurable) attention allocation 
between controlling and monitoring tasks. 
A different approach to the real-time determination of human atten-
tion allocation between controlling and monitoring tasks is provided in 
Ref. 56. This approach uses an algorithm employing fading-memory system 
identification and linear discriminant analysis. The identification 
algorithm is used to determine the input-to-output relationship of the 
human operator in combination with the controlled element. A linear 
discriminant function is then used to detect identified parameter 
changes that indicate a shift in the operator's allocation of attention 
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(between controlling and monitoring) in excess of what is expected from 
a norm. The norm can be a running average of the discriminant as in 
Ref. 56 or could be based on a running average of the eye scanning 
measurements. 
The authors conclude that the feasibility of the method in Ref. 56 
depends on the control task being predo~nant and the monitoring task 
requiring infrequent attention. If events being monitored occurred 
frequently, the identifier did not adapt quickly enough and the relative 
measures of the discriminant function did not react appropriately. This 
may have been because the authors chose to subject the identified coef-
ficients of the difference equation to discriminant analysis. 
Reference 57 shows that frequency domain measures are preferable to 
difference equation coefficients for representing identified parameter 
changes in a unique and sensitive way. 
4. Monitoring Automatic Control 
If we beg the question of the role for human intervention following 
detection of a failure during automatic landing, the results of measure-
ments reported in Ref. 58 provide elapsed times for failure detection as 
functions of failure magnitude. The failures were restricted to glide 
slope and airspeed instrument failures, so that they did not affect the 
operation of the automatic landing system. 
The fixed base simulation in Ref. 58 comprised the last five minutes 
of transport aircraft landing approaches starting on course at 2500 ft 
height and 10 miles from the runway threshold with fully automatic con-
trol. A high percentage (83 percent) of runs with single instrument 
failures was chosen to provide sufficient data for analysts of variance 
in a reasonable experimental interval of simulator occupancy. Obviously 
such a high failure rate is unrealistic and might bias the pilot to ex-
pect the failure. If full mission simulation and a more realistic 
failure rate had been employed, however, the effects of fatigue on the 
vigilance of the pilot might have confounded the results. (The authors 
include a compensating observation error threshold in the fitted model 
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of the pilot's decision function to correct for the a priori probability 
of failure in making realistic predictions.) 
The participating pilots were told in advance that failures at 
random times would occur in either the airspeed or glide slope indica-
tors, but that they should use other instruments for verification. 
There was no feedback to the pilot concerning his failure detection 
performance, however, because it was found in previous experiments 
(Ref. 59) that such feedback biased his next decision. His knowledge of 
a sequence of mistakes drove him to overcompensate with intense vigi-
lance, and vice versa. When the pilot detected a failure, he pressed a 
button and the run was terminated. Otherwise, the run continued through 
touchdown, after which the pilot filled out a report in which he stated 
which instrument had failed and how he detected the failure. 
The experimental results are interpreted with the aid of a fitted 
algorithmic model of the pilot as a monitor. The model includes a 
linear estimator and a decision rule. The linear estimator is a Kalman 
filter with measurement errors, rather than state estimates, as outputs. 
The decision rule is based on sequential analysis, but is modified for 
the special case of failure detection. 
The use of the model for predicting absolute values of detection 
times depends on the limited experience in Refs. 58 and 59. In general, 
the pilots in both experiments preferred to operate at approximately 
equivalent but relatively low probabilities of false alarm and miss 
(= 0.05) with an observation error threshold between one-sixth and one-
quarter of the observed standard deviation. These results need now to 
be compared with analogous results obtained under more realistic condi-
tions to determine effects of crew fatigue on vigilance. Furthermore, 
experiments in monitoring automatic control must also consider the roles 
for human intervention after a failure has been detected as well as the 
effects of human participation in advance of a failure on vigilance. 
Before we discuss in the final topic some measurements which addressed 
this issue of the effects of participation on vigilance, we shall men-
tion another theoretical treatment intended to help in interpreting 
measurements of the human operator's monitoring behavior. 
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Algorithmic techniques are also applied in Ref. 60 to develop two 
theoretical models for predicting human operator performance when moni-
toring an automatically controlled system. In one construct it is 
hypothesized that the operator monitors displays in order to detect 
failures most rapidly. In the other construct it is assumed that the 
displays are sampled in order to reconstruct the system status informa-
tion in some sense which is optimal. In both cases the models employ a 
fractional value of attention to monitoring each displayed variable. 
These fractional values of attention are not necessarily measurable 
unless they can be correlated with eye scanning statistics to be dis-
cussed in Subsection E. Furthermore, the cost functionals employed in 
the respective optimization processes are not readily measurable either, 
unless subjective evaluations of the operator's strategy are used to 
assess the relative importance of costs. 
The authors of Ref. 60 also discuss the relationship of their two 
theoretical models to existing prediction techniques for monitoring 
based on equal attention, peak excursion monitoring, and Nyquist fre-
quency, for examples. The authors conclude that a weighted combination 
of failure detection and status estimation criteria offers the best 
potential for interpreting measurements of human operator monitoring 
behavior. 
5. Monitoring Manual and Automatic Control 
In our final topic of this section, we call the reader's attention 
to the measurements reported in Ref. 61, which examined the effects of 
the pilot's participation in the control task on his workload and fail-
ure detection performance during a simulated low visibility landing 
approach in a transport aircraft in turbulence. In these experiments 
the 'failures occurred in either the lateral or pitch a~is of the flight 
control system so as to cause relatively slow drift in the course or 
flight path of the aircraft. Subtle failures, rather than hardover 
failures, were deliberately chosen to exercise the threshold of the 
pilot's failure detection capability. Sometimes the failure occurred in 
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an automatically controlled axis; other times, in a manually controlled 
axis. 
The fixed base simulation in Ref. 61 began on the final approach 
course at a point seven miles beyond the outer marker and terminated 
either at touchdown or when a positive rate of climb had been estab-
lished following the initiation of a go-around by the pilot. Failures 
were introduced "randomly but only between the heights of 1800 and 800 
feet (inside the outer marker). Although commercial transport landings 
were being addressed with airline pilots participating, the simulator 
did not incorporate all of the display and control capabilities neces-
sary for Category 3 operations. Hence the authors elected to require a 
missed approach in the event that a pilot detected a failure. Thus the 
related issues of human intervention to correct, recover, and land were 
aVOided, and failure detection time ~s adopted as the only measurement 
in the control failure experiments. 
The experiments involved four levels of pilot participation in moni-
toring and controlling the aircraft: 
a) Pilot monitoring all axes with autopilot con-
trolling all axes 
b) Pilot controlling only the lateral axis with 
autopilot controlling the pitch axis and auto-
throttle coupled 
c) Pilot controlling the pitch axis and throttles 
with autopilot controlling only the lateral axis 
d) Pilot controlling all axes. 
Workload measurements were made in the absence of failures with the 
aid of a disjunctive reaction time measurement using a red warning 
light-cancelling subsidiary task. A workload index ~s computed in the 
manner of Ref. 62. Failure detection time measurements were made in the 
absence of the light-cancelling subSidiary task. 
The workload measured with the pilot controlling the pitch axis and 
throttles (split axis participation Case c above) ~s over 50 percent 
greater than the workload measured with the pilot controlling only the 
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lateral axis (split axis participation Case b above). The workload 
index was approximately additive with respect to the manual control 
task. 
The failure detection times in a manually controlled axis were 
significantly longer than detection times in an automatically controlled 
axis. Failures went undetected only in a manually controlled axis. 
Detection times for lateral axis failures were significantly longer 
than for pitch axis failures at comparable levels of workload. 
Higher levels of root-mean-square turbulence velocity resulted in 
higher levels of workload and longer failure detection times at compar-
able levels of pilot participation. 
Since an increase in workload accompanied an increase in the level 
of pilot participation, the authors attempted to separate the effects of 
participation and workload on failure detection time. In fact, 
detection time did not increase monotonically with workload, thus sug-
gesting that participation level did indeed influence detection time 
over and above the concomitant increase in workload. Nevertheless, 
increases in workload induced by turbulence without a change in level of 
pilot participation did increase detection time significantly. 
Not investigated in this study and thus remaining a subject for re-
search are the related issues of human intervention to recover and land, 
given that the necessary performnce monitors, fault annunciators, and 
flight control displays are provided. A variety of flight tests (e.g., 
Refs. 63, 64, and 65) have suggested that such successful intervention 
is possible. 
D. EVALUATING MEASURES WICH REFLECT OPERATOR YORKLOAD 
Workload motivates the human operator up to a point, where, in his 
judgment, either he experiences difficulty in maintaining the desired 
(or required) task performance by adapting his behavior, strategy, or 
technique ~ he believes he may no longer be capable of coping to a 
prescribed degree with an unexpected .intrusion or failure. Operational 
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conditions such as these represent limits to the adaptability of an 
operator. In such limiting conditions, an operator is liable to err, 
and system performance is likely to degrade. Such operational condi-
tions are said to impose high cognitive or perceptual-motor loading, 
which, for our purposes here, can be defined as the conscious involve-
ment of the operator~s corresponding systems in various tasks. 
It has proven difficult to assess the compatibility of a man-machine 
system solely on the basis of a system performance decrement under 
cognitive and/or perceptual motor loading, because: (i) the human 
operator maintains a fairly wide workload margin, (ii) his homeostatic 
stability tends to attenuate measured variations in his performance and 
in his antonomic and somatic functions under stress, and (iii) varia-
tions in his cerebrospinal functions are even more difficult to measure 
and interpret. Furthermore, there are as yet no universal commensurate 
measures of the different types of loading among these functions which 
characterize the human operator nor among the different types of tasks 
which characterize national airspace operations. Consequently, other 
measures of operator loading have been used perforce. 
The most ~ommon succcessful measure of workload has been subjective, 
viz., pilot opinion rating. Although of psychometric quality, these 
ratings are heavily weighted by an "expert~s" introspective impression 
of the task loading and are more.reliable as relative measurements when 
employed in comparative circumstances. Nevertheless the most common 
pilot opinion rating scales, the Cooper and Cooper-Harper scales, have 
acquired disciplined significance in rating flying qualities and are now 
commonly accepted as absolute measurements when rendered by trained 
experimental test pilots. 
For discrete tasks in combination with more or less continuous 
control tasks, for supervisory control tasks with great latencies, and 
for most communication and navigation tasks, identifying and predicting 
detailed dynamic cognitive and sensorimotor behavior and associated 
workload are beyond current capabilities. In general, these types of 
tasks exhibit one or more of the following characteristics. 
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1. May need to be performed during high activity 
periods and can take a substantial amount of 
time. 
2. May require extended cognitive activities with-
out measurable response, including concentra-
tion, memory, logic, and/or referral to and 
correlation of supplementary data sources (for 
example, maps, charts, notes) for performance. 
3. May precipitate a chain reaction of additional 
tasks into future time if not performed at the 
proper time on operator's initiative. 
4. Can be performed incorrectly, omitted, or de-
layed for a significant time period after per-
formance is required before it becomes obvious 
that something is wrong. Stated differently, it 
may require the operator to remember that at 
some specific future time he must perform some 
specific control functions. 
Because the principles of these and other types of operator sensori-
motor behavior and workload assessments are at the exploratory or low-
confidence fringe of the theory of manual control, full mission simula-
tion and empirical testing techniques must be employed. Among the 
objective measurements needed are those which are indicative of cogni-
tive and perceptual-motor workload. 
Various techniques have been developed for the estimation of the 
cognitive and perceptual-motor workload imposed upon the human operator 
of a complex vehicle (Refs. 66 through 74). We have partitioned these 
into the six basic categories and subsidiary techniques listed in 
Table 6. 
Table 6 is arranged in approximate order of increasing complexity of 
measurement. A summary of the more relevant workload identification. 
techniques is given by Ref. 74. A brief review and critique of each 
technique with references has also been given in Chapter VI of Ref. 75, 
and an updated annotated bibliography, using the topics of Table 6, is 
available as Ref. 69. We shall comment briefly on each major category 
in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6 
TYPES OF COGNITIVE AND PERCEPTUAL-MOTOR 
WORKLOAD MEASUREMENTS 
A. Subjective Psychometric Ratings (supported by answers to 
questionnaires and by operator commentary) 
B. Objective Workload Correlates 
1. Auxiliary task techniques 
.1 Auxiliary workload margin at a constant main task level of 
performance 
.a Adaptive psychomotor task 
.b Adaptive cognitive task 
.2 Main task performance decrement at prescribed auxiliary task 
loads 
.a Discrete-response auxiliary task 
.b Forced scanning task 
.C Multiaxis tracking and flying 
2. Varying difficulty main task 
.1 Sudden change in effective controlled element dynamics 
usually adverse 
.2 Critical instability task 
.3 Adaptive change in effective controlled element dynamics or 
difficulty 
.4 Variable forcing function noise content at prescribed 
auxiliary task load 
.5 Interrupted perception on main task and continuous 
tachistoscopy 
3. Eye-point-of-regard measurements 
.1 Scanning behavior patterns 
.2 Scanning workload 
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TABLE 6 (Concluded) 
4. Operator's dynamic behavior (e.g., describing function and 
remnant parameters) 
C. Psychophysiological Correlates 
1. Heart rate 
2. Respiration rate 
3. Neuromuscular tension 
4. Evoked cortical potentials 
5. Galvanic skin response 
6. Pupillometric response 
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1. Subjective Psychometric Ratings 
Subjective rating, such as given by the Cooper scale shown in 
Table 7 or by the modified Cooper-Harper scale in Fig. 13 (Ref. 76), is 
a direct workload index in that the actual mission can be performed 
without additional measuring equipment or tasks being required. The 
Cooper scale and Cooper-Harper scale (Ref. 77) are very nearly func-
tionally psychometric (Ref. 78). The error introduced by averaging 
Cooper ratings, rather than their psychometric equivalent, is small pro-
vided enough trials have been made to ensure confidence in the ratings. 
The Cooper and Cooper-Harper scales are shown in Ref. 78 to be overly 
sensitive at the inferior ends, so that attaching significance to a dif-
ference of one Cooper unit between ratings at the inferior end would 
require a relatively large number of trials. 
The state-of-the-art is well developed for making flying qualities 
ratings that are reliable and meaningful with respect to operational 
task demands and vehicle response characteristics. However conSiderably 
less work has been devoted to calibrating objective correlates of pilot 
workload in terms of pilot opinion ratings simply because few measurable 
workload indices have been available. Psychometric rating scales for 
task evaluation in terms of "controllability and precision" and "atten-
tional workload" are presented in Table 8 fran Ref. 55. Two scales for 
rating the usefulness of the status information and the amount of clut-
ter in the display are also presented in Table 8 from Ref. 55. 
2. Objective Workload Correlates 
a. Auxiliary Task Techniques. By far the most common technique for 
controlling and measuring perceptual-motor loading is the use of auxili-
ary tasks of one type or another. The auxiliary task is intended to 
occupy the operator's reserve (or excess) capacity in one sensorimotor 
modality. However, it has been established that the reserve capacity 
measured in one sensory modality may not apply to other modalities. 
Therefore, it is vital that the sensorimotor modality of the loading 
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Table 7. The Original Cooper Scale (From Ref. 79) 
COOPER PR 
.. -
PRIMARY CAN BE ADJEC!IVE MISSION DESCRIPl'ION r-USSION LANDED? RATING ACCOMPLISHED? 
Excellent, Yes Yes 1 
includes optimum 
Good, Satisfactory Normal Yes Yes 2 pleasant to fly operation 
Satisfactory, but with 
some mildly Wlpleasant Yes Yes 3 
characteristics 
Acceptable, but 
with Wlpleasant Yes Yes 4 
characteristics 
Unacceptable Unsatisfactory Emergency Doubtful Yes 5 for normal operation operation 
Acceptable for emer-
gency ope.ration (stab. Doubtful Yes 6 
aug. failure) only 
Unacceptable even for 
emergency condition No Doubtful 7 (stab. aug. failure) 
Unacceptable - Unacceptable No No dangerous operation No 8 
Unacceptable - No Wlcontrollable No 9 
$7/*~ Did not get Unprintable What back to report mission? 10 
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task be representative of sensorimotor loading in the operational situa-
tion. Furthermore it is important to select an auxiliary task that has 
some relevance and face validity for the operator in the context of his 
customary and exceptional duties. 
Kelley, Hudson, and others have developed the cross-adaptive input 
scheme (Refs. 80 and 81) for varying the difficulty of auxiliary track-
ing tasks to insure that a constant main task level of performance is 
maintained. In this type of scheme, the difficulty of the auxiliary 
task increases as long as the main task error is less than a criterion 
level, and vice versa for errors over the criterion. The asymptotic 
level of auxiliary task difficulty then provides a measure of the opera-
tor~s excess control capacity with respect to the main task. 
One of the most promising techniques for measuring excess control 
capacity is the cross-coupled adaptive subcritical tracking task de-
scribed in Appendix B. In this technique the instability of the auxili-
ary task increases as long as the main task error is less than a crite-
rion and vice versa for errors over the criterion. The asymptotic value 
of the instability is proportional to the operator~s excess control 
capacity with respect to the main task*. As long as the operator~s 
normal complement of tasks includes a tracking control task, it is usu-
ally possible to embed the cross-coupled adaptive subcritical tracking 
* It turns out that the asymptotic value of the instability is an 
objective correlate of subjective rating and, in fact, from ~ubjective 
ratings one can estimate the excess control capacity via the calibration 
of the objective correlate in terms of subjective rating (Ref. 12). In 
many cases the measurement of excess capacity need not be made! 
Nevertheless we need more extensive calibrations of the objective 
correlate in terms of subjective rating, including some which demand a 
level of skill development higher than compensatory and Which involve 
more than a single operator. 
Workload is monotonically related to excess control capacity, 
attentional demands, and ability to cope with the unexpected. All three 
of these can be measured objectively for situations Where a subjective 
assessment of cognitive (e.g., search and recognition, monitoring, 
decision making, etc.) and/or control tasks can be found. These 
calibrations between subjective and objective measures are thereafter 
used to quantify the workloads without having to resort to elaborate, 
time-consuming, and sometimes non-realistic objective procedures. 
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task among the operator's tasks with high face validity (for example, 
see Ref. 82). If on the other hand, the operator does not customarily 
perform a suitable tracking control task, or there appears to be no 
valid way to embed the cross-coupled subcritical tracking task with high 
face validity, it may be possible to embed an auxiliary cognitive task 
instead. 
An auxiliary cognitive task involving item recognition, also de-
scribed in Appendix B, can often be embedded among the visual or audi-
tory commands and voice "traffic" reaching an operator. Horeover an 
item recognition task can even be adaptively cross coupled to the ope-
rator's error performance on his primary task to avoid encroachment so 
that the resulting measurement will more accurately reflect reserve 
capacity (Ref. 83). Details of this adaptive cross-coupling are also 
described in Appendix B. 
Using one or more of the auxiliary task techniques described above 
could be extremely valuable for increasing the effectiveness of the 
proposed full-mission simulation. One possible scenario would be to 
induce fatigue by having a flight crew fly a part-task simulator that 
was configured with ~n auxiliary task(s) prior to flying the ful1-
mission simulator. The same part-task simulator could be used to simu-
late aircraft interacting with that employed in the full-mission simula-
tion and flown by alternate crews. 
b. Varying Difficulty Main Task. The leading contender for the 
continuous type of main task loadi~g is the use of a critical instabil-
ity task, as described in Refs. 84-87. 
For operational situations involving failure management, an ordinary 
continuous auxiliary task loading is not appropriate. A progressively 
degraded main task or possibly an unexpected change in controlled ele-
ment properties would be better (Ref. 48). 
Reference 88 has also successfully employed a variable disturbance 
forcing function for the main task by regulating a prescribed auxiliary 
task load. Reference 89 has employed interrupted perception on the main 
task to vary its difficulty. 
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c. Eye-Point-of-Regard Measurements. This is the original measure 
of pilot fatigue proposed by McGehee (Ref. 90) and evolved by Fitts, 
et al (Refs. 91-102). If gross inconsistencies with the display 
arrangement hypothesis (Ref. 103) are observed on a display arrangement, 
scanning and eye traffic measures are indicators of abnormal 
distributions of scanning workload. However, these are not absolute 
measures and are useful only in comparing the partition of scanning 
workload among different display arrangements. In connection with 
integrated displays, measures of scanning and eye traffic may suggest 
phenomena like "stare mode" or "tunnel vision." In a stare mode, fixing 
the eye-point-of-regard serves to stabilize the eye for good parafoveal 
viewing, and the measured fixation point may be unrelated to the 
info mation actually being used. Conversely, "tunnel vision" wi thout 
scanning may exclude perception of some para foveal signals needed for 
multiloop control. Additional measures such as the describing function 
might be required to resolve the ambiguity between these two 
phenomena. Eye-point-of-regard measurments will be discussed more fully 
in Subsection E. 
d. Measured Pilot Response Characteristics. The value of measured 
pilot response properties such as the adaptive parameters (gains, lead, 
lag, effective time delay) fitted to the pilot's describing function, 
system stability margins, and pilot remnant properties, lies in their 
empirical correlations with high workload situations. For example, we 
know that the requirements for generation of lead-time constants in 
excess of 1 sec are considered. high workload tasks by pilots. The 
increment in effective time delay that accompanies low frequency lead 
generation has in the past been considered a cause of perceptual-motor 
load. Reciprocal effective time delay as a function of the order of low 
frequency lead equalization is shown in Fig. 14. These parameters have 
been correlated primarily with handling qualities ratings and not with 
perceptual-motor load measures as such. The component of effective time 
delay which is related principally to neuromuscular tension provides one 
of the clearest examples of an association between a measure of pilot 
response which is known to demand higher subjective workload and a phy-
siological measure. Figure 15 shows that the average effective time 
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delay decreases as average neuromuscular tension increases. Such corre-
lations need to be established before one can predict pilot response 
properties to meet the task demands using multiloop feedback theory and 
established pilot adaptation rules. 
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3. Psychophysiological. Correlates 
Many workload measurement schemes include additional measurements on 
the pilot-vehicle system. A battery of psychophysiological measurements 
is very attractive because such measurements can easily be made during 
the performance of the actual or simulated task and do not require 
auxiliary tasks to provide a score. The basic assumption is that the 
physiological variables are in some way correlated with the workload of 
the task at hand. These correlations have not yet been firmly estab-
lished and the interrelationships among them are only beginning to be 
understood (Ref. 62, 105, and 106). The most popular measurements are 
those related to the cardiovascular and respiratory systems: heart rate 
and its variation on a beat-to-beat basis (sometimes called heart accel-
eration); various measures of pulse pressure, breathing rate, depth of 
breathing, tidal volume, and so on. Measurements of neuromuscular in-
volvement include filtered absolute electromyogram levels in both the 
active and passive limbs, integrated absolute electromyograph from a 
series of sites, grip pressure, neuromuscular tremor frequencies, etc. 
In certain cases there are strong correlations between physiological 
measurements. For example, in the resting state there is a periodic 
psychophysiological fluctuation in the heart rate called "sinus 
arrythmia," which often correlates with the periodicity of breathing. 
Under high perceptual-motor loading conditions the sinus arrythmia tends 
to vanish, while the average heart rate tends to elevate somewhat. 
Preliminary data from continuous tracking with a subcritica1 unstable 
controlled element suggest that the change in sinus' arrythmia amplitude 
accompanies higher bodily neuromuscular tension levels. Ka1sbeek has 
also found an analogous attenuation in sinus arrythmia under ADT stress 
(Ref. 107). 
Some measures of more emotional involvement include a number of va-
riations of galvanic skin response (GSR best exemplified by palmar skin 
resistance), eye pupil diameter, and local temperature fluctuations at 
selected skin sites. There is evidence that pupil10metric fluctuations 
and sudden decreases in palmar skin resistance accompany systemic 
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pulsations in neuromuscular tension that seem to follow "arming" changes 
in perceived signals. 
One of the few measurements presumably directly related to mental 
activity is electroencephalogram (EEG). However, just what combination 
of sites and what signals best indicate perceptual-motor loading has not 
been determined. The most common indicator of awareness is taken to be 
the changes in the alpha-rhythm component of the EEG signals that at 
least show an observable correlation with certain visual and mental 
activities. Such measurements are very popular in the USSR (Refs. 108 
and 109), in the Netherlands (Refs. 107, 110, and Ill), and in England 
(Ref. 112). In the United States, Roman has collected in-flight meas-
urements during simulated and .real missions (Ref. 113). 
We have examined and selected a number of psychophysiological meas-
urements for investigation in NASA-sponsored critical task research. 
Based upon a survey of the literature and consultation with a number of 
researchers in the field, those measurements that appear to be most 
relevent are: instanteneous heart rate and acceleration, respiration 
rate and acceleration, depth of breathing, palmar skin resistance, 
passive limb EMG, grip pressure, and eye blink rate. Fairly standard 
techniques are available for all of these measurements, and they lend 
themselves to either simulator or in-flight situations. 
E. EYE POINT OF REGARD (EPR) MEASUREMENTS 
As mentioned in the previous section, EPR measurements can be used 
to obtain the pilot1s monitoring workload margin while performing either 
manual or automatic tasks. EPR measurements are also used for other 
purposes in conjunction with flight control and monitoring tasks, some 
of which are discussed in this subsection. The two subsequent topics 
discuss problems in reducing raw EPR data and future applications, 
respectively. 
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1. Background 
A summary of eye movement studies in flight control and monitoring 
tasks is contained in Ref. 108 from which the following is extracted 
directly: 
"The inspiration for much of this [prior] eye 
movement work was founded on the belief that the 
cues used by the pilot in controlling flight would 
be revealed by noting the (separated) instruments 
upon which the fovea of the eye was fixating inside 
the cockpit under instrument flight rules, and by 
correlating the directions of fixations external to 
the cockpit with signficant ground-based cues in 
landing approaches under visual flight rules. 
Information about the useful instrument flight 
control cues was believed to be fundamental to an 
understanding of the function served by flight 
instruments. It was expected that this understand-
ing would, in turn, form a basis for improving the 
design of aircraft instruments, increasing the 
efficiency of instrument flight training, and sim-
plifying the task of instrument flying. 
"Today we are still working to fulfill this 
expectation, because the premise on which it was 
founded twenty years ago has been shown to be only a 
partial truth for several reasons. Pilots develop 
an ability to operate effectively on parafoveally 
and peripherally perceived information (Ref. 115), 
albeit with some limitations (Ref. 116), and, of 
course, on reinforcing (i.e., nonconflicting) motion 
and aural cues. Further, there is considerable 
indirect evidence (e.g., Ref. 117) that in 'stare 
mode' circumstances fixing the eye-point-of-regard 
serves merely to stabilize the eyeball for good 
parafoveal viewing, so that the fixation point may 
be unconnected with the information actually used, 
or even perceived, by the pilot. We cannot say that 
what is being fixated necessarily corresponds to an 
input. 
"The inspiration for the earliest pilots' eye 
movement studies -- that scan patterns might be 
useful for workload measures -- was revived more 
recently in Ref. 118. While scan patterns are 
indeed relevant to workload, the connection is not 
simple. The eye requires fixation to keep the 
eyeball stable, so there is a kind of Parkinson's 
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law for the eyeball--- the sum of the fixation dwell 
times on the instruments expands or contracts to 
equal the time available (neglecting saccadic 
times). There is, of course, a minimum dwell time 
of about 0.4 sec per instrument, so it is possible 
to contrive saturated conditions where the control 
task demands pilot fixations on too many instruments 
too often in order to maintain control. But the 
interpretation of such results would often be ambi-
guous if one is looking for the pilot~s inputs. 
"The principal cost of the pi1ot~s scanning 
behavior is an increased ~remnant.~ This depends on 
the sampling frequency, fixation dwell time, and 
sampling frequency variations, as well as the ob-
served signal variance. The remnant represents 
pilot control movements Which are incoherent, i.e., 
not linearly correlated (via the describing. func-
tion) with the externally imposed forcing functions. 
The remnant acts like an injected noise, and is the 
real cause of saturation in multi-instrument dis-
plays. So, as we said at the outset, measurement of 
eye fixation is certainly connected with pilot 
inputs and workload but the connection is by no 
means simple." 
A sample of the type of data that can be inferred from EPR measure-
ments is shown in Fig. 16 (adapted from Ref. 119). The instruments 
shown in this figure and their positions relative to one another are 
representative of most conventional jet transports. The numbers within 
instruments shown in Fig. 16 are called the "dwell fractions," which 
represent the proportion of the total time during which fixations dwell 
on a particular instrument. Since the cumulative sum of all dwell 
fractions, including blinks and distractions, ~ equal unity, by 
definition, the dwell fraction is also termed "fractional scanning 
workload" or "probability of fixation." 
The numbers between the arrows shown in Fig. 16 are called the "one-
way link-values," which are the proportion of all fixation transitions 
which go in the specified direction between a,pair of instruments. The 
sum of the two one-way link-values between a pair of instruments is 
called the .• two-way" link value. In 1950, new research extended the 
display arrangement hypothesis of 1944 to suggest that the pattern of 
link-values between instruments 1s indicative of the goodness of 
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different panel arrangements. Since, in point of fact, the scanning 
statistics are quite stationary over measurement intervals as short as 
100 sec, different one-way link-values between the same pair of instru-
ments are also indicative of determinism in scan patterns. If the 
pilot's scanning behavior were represented by a truly random process 
(i .e., there was no deterministic "pattern") then the one-way link-
values would be of equal magnitude. The results in Ref. 119 show no 
evidence of circulatory determinism in the scanning statistics. This 
simplification proves useful in making predictions of scanning behavior 
(Ref. 104). 
2. Reduction of EPR Data 
Widespread use of eye-point-of-regard data has always been hampered 
by the large amount of time required to reduce and process the raw EPR 
data. Because of this only a small fraction of the large amounts of EPR 
data recorded are ever used. Some of the general problems encountered 
in reducing raw EPR data, independent of the method used to record it, 
are discussed below. 
The raw data for modern EPR measurement systems (e.g., Ref. 120) are 
usually available in the form of voltages that are proportional to the 
displacement of the fixation point in the visual field. In the past, 
these voltages have been recorded on strip charts and then manually 
reduced at the end of the experiment (e.g., subject looking at Instru-
ment 5 for 2.3 sec, etc.). It turns out that the human analyst is 
extremely efficient at filtering out artifacts present in the raw EPR 
data but the turn-around time is long. Also, boredom probably causes a 
certain amount of error in the data reduction. 
The raw EPR voltages could be converted to digital signals and sent 
to a computer which could, theoretically, be programed to process the 
raw EPR data automatically. Getting the raw EPR data into a computer is 
not a problem, but designing an algorithm that will properly reduce the 
EPR data has, to date, frustrated some researchers (e.g., Ref. 121). 
Some of the artifacts 1n the raw EPR data that cause problems are dis-
cussed below. 
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a. Noise. There are two sources of noise in the raw EPR data. 
First, the eyeball is constantly moving in order to create a stable 
image. Thus, even though a subject may be fixating on a single point in 
the visual field, the EPR measuring system will detect "movement." 
Second, the EPR measuring system itself may cause noise due to the 
method used to obtain the EPR voltages. The data reduction algorithm 
must reject both sources of noise. 
b. Blinks and "Glitches." When a subject blinks it usually pro-
duces a definite and fairly repeatable pattern in the EPR signals (e.g., 
for the STr EPR system blinks appear as a quick look down and to the 
left). "Glitches" look like drop-outs in the data and are probably due 
to artifacts in the measuring equipment. The patterns produced by both 
glitches and blinks are easily recognized by the human analyst, but it 
is difficult to program a computer to recognize and correct these pat-
terns. 
c. Saccades and Fake Looks. A saccade, a quick jump in the point 
of regard, occurs when the EPR is in the process of transitioning from 
one instrument to another. The EPR Signal, however, will appear to slew 
across the visual field, rather than immediately jump from one point to 
the next. Also, a "fake look" to a point in the visual field can .result 
when the subject is transitioning from Point A to Point B and passes, 
but does not dwell, over Point C. As with blinks and glitches the 
saccades and fake looks are fairly easy patterns for the human analyst 
to recognize but it can be difficult to devise a computer algorithm to 
recognize them. 
Other artifacts in the data due to the particular EPR system being 
used may also be present and must be considered if the algorithm is to 
be successful in automatically reducing the EPR data. For example, the 
STr EPR system uses the eyelid to detect indirectly the vertical move-
ment of the eye. This unfortunately contaminates the EPR data with the 
eyelid dynamics, which appear to be nonlinear. 
Even though the problem is difficult, as elucidated above, it is 
believed that a successful algorithm to reduce EPR data automaically can 
be developed. An algorithm for the STr EPR system has been developed 
but to date has not been programmed and tested with actual EPR data. 
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3. Future Applications 
Future applications of EPR data will be dependent, at least to some 
degree, on the success of developing algorithms to reduce and process 
the raw EPR data automatically. The following partial list of future 
applications assumes that this capability is readily available. 
a. Error Detection. How long does it take to detect an error 
condition? Is the error condition confirmed by cross checking? If so, 
what information is used to confirm the error condition? How long is it 
from the time when the error is detected until the time when corrective 
action is taken? 
b. Emergency Action. What information is being used, or perhaps 
misused, in an emergency? 
c. IFR to VFR Transition. How much cross checking of head-down 
instruments is done after "runway-in-sight?" What head-down instruments 
are used? 
d. Display Optimization. Although this is not a "new" application 
it will continue to be a future application of EPR data, especially as 
it becomes easier and cheaper to process the raw EPR data. 
e. Decision-Making Identification. What information is being used 
to make comlex decisions? Can EPR data be helpful in combined decision 
making and control strategy identification techniques? 
f. Control Behavior Identification. A tacit assumption of current 
methods used for identifying pilot control strategy is knowledge of what 
the pilot is looking at. This is especially true of multiloop control 
tasks where the pilot control strategy is not "always unique. Direct 
correlation of EPR data and control activity would be useful in these 
more complex control tasks. EPR data has already been correlated with 
measurements of the pilot's remnant in several experiments (Refs. 54 and 
55) with favorable results which demonstrate the reality of scanning 
remnant as a cause of saturation in multi-instrument flight tasks. EPR" 
data may also provide insight into latent control activity and the phe-
nomenon of control reversals in flight simulators. 
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SECTION VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A wide variety of proven measurements and data-reduction techniques 
suitable for identifying human error are recommended for use in connec-
tion with the NASA-Ames Research Center Man-Vehicle Systems Research 
Simulator Facility. Most of the measurement techniques are sufficiently 
unobtrusive that they do not interfere with either full mission simula-
tion experiments or the operation of the simulator facilities. Many of 
the measurements will provide reduced data in situ for timely evaluation 
while an experiment is in progress. These and other measurements are 
also appropriate for describing ensembles of data in those instances 
where probabilistic generalizations may be justified after the experi-
ment has been concluded. 
Examination of the definitions, types, and sources of human error 
from Ref. 1 which need to be identified suggests that the classes of 
measurements indicated in Table 9 and further elaborated in Table 10 
will distinguish certain types among the corresponding groups of human 
errors listed. Notice, however, in Table 9 that a particular class of 
measurements is capable of identifying more than one type of error. For 
this reason interpretation of a variety of measurements may be required 
to identify a particular source or type of error. In this respect the 
additional clues provided in Tables 9 through 11 in Appendix A hereto 
may be especially useful in helping to interpret system performance-
centered and operator-centered measurements. Tables 12 and 13 in Appen-
dix A, are designed to assist in the more difficult problem of identify-
ing causes of error leading to inappropriate organization of perception 
and behavior at the executive level of the operator's activity-
supervising control. This level of activity transcends the operator's 
various directly involved systems, such as the perceptual, cerebro-
spinal, autonomic and neuromuscular systems about which particular 
measurements can be made. 
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TABLE 9 
MEASUREMENTS FOR IDENTIFYING HUMAN ERROR 
Groups of Distinguishing Measurements 
System Performance-Centered Procedure-
Measurements Operator-Centered Measurements Centered Measurements 
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Extreme command or disturbance X X X X X X X X X X 
amplitude 
Extreme command or disturbance X X X X X X X X X X bandwidth 
Controlled-element change X X X X X X X X X X 
Reduced attentional field in X X X X single channel operations 
Diverted or divided attention 
and perceptual scanning in X X X X X X X X 
nlulti-input operations 
Reversals X X X 
Illusions, kinetosis X X X X X 
Spontaneous improper actions X X X X 
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TABLE 10 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE MEASUREMENTS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA 
PROCEDURE-GENTERED (Comparative evaluation criteria are based on 
standard pre-experimental time line analyses 
for the scenario) 
Evaluation of discrete stimuli, responses, sequences, and latencies in 
time domain among the .normal and emergency procedures involved in the 
following activities: 
Supervising and executing checklists 
ATC clearance compliance and reporting 
Execution of the flight plans and alternates, including flight 
profile management and use of change-over points 
Communication 
Navigation 
Identification 
Book-keeping, record-keeping, document and library management 
Aircraft systems operation (e.g., propulsion, fuel, electrical, 
hydraulic, wheels, brakes, auxiliary power, anti-icing, and 
environmental radar) 
Flying, i.e., guidance and control; manually and automatically 
Tactical decisions 
Overall crew supervision, management, and integration 
SYSTEM PERFOR.'1ANCE (Evaluation criteria are commensurate with 
metrics and absolute in value) 
Stability (e.g., phase or gain margins) 
Command-following frequency bandwidth or temporal latency 
Disturbance regulation bandwidth or latency 
Location along flight plans/profile: 
Location in state space and time with respect to authorized 
boundaries and schedules, including unauthorized ground proximity 
Propulsion: 
Location in state space with respect to critical limits 
Structural load factors with respect to critical limits 
Aerodynamic stall margins 
Weight and center of gravity with respect to critical limits 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
SYSTEM PERFO~~NCE (Evaluation criteria are commensurate with 
metrics and absolute in value) (cont.) 
At Approach Window: 
Location in state space with respect to window boundaries 
Probability of Approach Success 
At Touchdown: 
Longitudinal and Lateral Touchdown Location with respect to runway 
Sink Rate 
Sideslip 
Heading 
Pitch, and Roll Attitudes 
Ai rs pe ed Erro r 
Composite Measures 
SAFETY MEASURES 
Probabilities (Evaluation criteria are commensurate) 
Successful Landing 
Successful Missed Approach 
Accident or Incident 
Margin (Stall, performance, etc.) 
Qualitative Assessments (Evaluation criteria are relative and 
subjective; the graceful degradation hypothesis provides a guide) 
Missed Approach Procedures 
Failure Detection Procedures 
Emergency Takeover Procedures 
OPERATOR-CENTERED PERFORMANCE AND ACCEPTANCE MEASURES 
Operator Dynamic Behavior (Evaluation criteria are relative) 
Describing Functions and Remnant (loops closed and equalization 
demanded; control-display associations and residual cross-
coupling; sensitivity of stability, disturbance regulation, and 
command-following performance to variations in gain, time delay, 
and equalization; the adaptive feedback selection hypothesis and 
successive organization of perception hypothesis provide guides) 
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TABLE 10 (Concluded) 
OPERATOR-GENTERED PERFO&~NCE AND ACCEPTANCE MEASURES (cont.) 
Operator Dynamic Behavior (evaluation criteria are relative) (cont.) 
Eye-Scanning Activity Distributions (incoherence in system 
performance caused by scanning remnant; system status monitoring 
threshold for confidence and decision making; the display 
arrangement hypothesis provides a guide.) 
Opinion Ratings (psychometric scales) 
Workload and Operability Assessment (excess control capacity; 
auxiliary task scores and loads; psychophysiological correlates; 
there is no guide to evaluation other than sensitivty and 
relative differences) 
Psychophysiological Correlates (Evaluation criteria are subjective and 
relative) 
Heart rate and acceleration 
Respiration rate and acceleration 
Depth of breathing 
Palmar skin resistance 
Passive limb electro myography 
Grip pressure 
Eye blink rate 
Operator Acceptance of System Performance 
Attitude, Attitude Rate, and Load Factor Variances from Trimmed 
Values (Evaluation criteria are commensurate and absolute, e.g., 
probabilities of exceeding acceptable levels from trimmed values) 
Control Displacement and Rate Variances from Trimmed Values 
(Evaluation criteria are commensurate and absolute, e.g., 
probabilities of exceeding maximum authorities) 
Response Compatibility and Motion Harmony--Automatic and Flight 
Director versus Manual Control (Evaluation criteria are relative 
to the response and motion attributes under manual control) 
Command Consistency--F1ight Director versus Manual Control 
(Evaluation criteria are based on the consonance between the 
spectral distribution of status variables in the director command 
and the displayed stqtus variables themselves) 
Qualitative Assessments 
Operator Commentary (evaluation criteria are subjective and 
relative) • 
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Table 10 elaborates first on the measurements for procedure-centered 
evaluation. These are primarily discrete stimuli, responses, sequences 
thereof and latencies therefor 1n the time domain among the normal and 
emergency procedures involved in the listed activities. The comparative 
discrete evaluation criteria needed to identify human errors must be 
based on thorough pre-experimental time line analyses for the scenario. 
It is preferable to institute automatic recording of discrete activities 
by the crew members wherever possible. Thereafter to detect errors it 
is possible to employ automatic comparison of the recorded time-line of 
discrete activities with the pre-experimentally recorded time line of 
"normal" and "emergency" procedures established for the scenario. 
Quantitative a~d qualitative system-centered performance measures 
and evaluation criteria are also listed in Table 10. Foremost among 
these are stability, command-following bandwidth and distance regulation 
bandwidth. Other system performance measures are ordinarily in the form 
of exceedences, means and variances since the major inputs of concern 
are random or can be considered such. The composite measures might be 
appropriate combinations of touchdown or window variables for example. 
The primary quantitative safety measures are expressed in probabilistic 
terms for commensurate evaluation. These are determined using the 
system performance measures (or, more precisely, their distributions) 
and the limiting factors of the scenario. Again for the approach and 
landing situation, examples might be Category II "window" sizes and 
landing gear limits. The assessments associated with safety are deter-
mined by evolVing scenarios for missed approach, failure detection and 
emergency takeover procedures, wherein the crew's ability to control the 
failed system is considered. 
Table 10 concludes with an elaboration of operator-centered perfor-
mance and acceptance measures which serve as diagnostic aids for 
detecting human error. Foremost among these, because of their proven 
reliability, are operator-describing functions and remnant, eye-scanning 
activity distributions, and subjective opinion ratings. The opinion 
rating provides an overall operator-centered assessment of the total 
system. It is based on the qualitative assessment of workload and the 
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operator equalization demanded by the multioperator management and 
control structure. It should be supported by objective workload and 
operability assessment (for which opinion rating is the best cali-
brator), by the various listed measures which confirm operator 
acceptance, and finally by operator commentary. 
For the procedure-centered human error data in Table 10 and other 
low probability events such as accidents or incidents, listed under 
I·Safe ty Measures'· in Table 10, we can usually depend on full mission 
simulation only for anecdotal and qualitative evaluation as in Ref. 5. 
Any statistical measures of confidence in procedural errors and other 
low probability outcomes would require months of accumulated experience 
at enormous cost. The outlook is much more favorable, however, for 
acquiring statistical measures of confidence in certain system-centered 
and operator-centered parameters from short-term temporal ensembles, 
where the ergodic hypothesis is reasonably valid. In this regard, 
system command-following bandwidth or latency, disturbance regulation 
bandwidth or latency, stability margin, and operator describing 
functions qualify from Table 10. 
Part-mission simulation offers economy in the investigation of human 
error by virtue of its ability to focus on a particular flight segment 
(e.g., approach and landing) without spending resources on portions of 
the flight (e.g., cruise) of lesser interest or in which fewer errors 
might be expected. Repeated simulation runs by one crew or an ensemble 
of simulations involving many crews become quite feasible. 
The possibilities for improper execution of the myriad of "normal and 
emergency procedures within a particular flight segment can be examined 
in more detail in advance for part-mission simulation, simply because 
the volume of alternative possibilities is reduced by comparison with 
that volume in full mission simulation. Thus one is more likely to be 
prepared in advance with the necessary alternative detailed procedural 
time line analyses for comparing and judging the discrete stimulus-
response activities to detect procedural errors in part-mission simula-
tion. 
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Planning data collection beforehand specifically for the anticipated 
data reduction and statistical analyses is a general requirement for 
studies of human behavior. A significant investment of time and effort 
beforehand will assure more productive results from the measurements 
obtained in the actual experiment. In addition to ensuring that the 
assumptions required for the analyses are met, consideration of the 
fiducial statistical tests provides guidance in deciding how. much data 
to collect. In some cases, evaluation of the power of a proposed test 
for detecting expected differences may lead to abandoning a measurement 
or even abandoning the experiment! 
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SEC~ION IV 
CLASSIFICA~ION OF ~ SOURCES AND DIS~INGUISEINQ 
CHARAC~RIS~ICS OF ERROR 
A thorough evaluation of piloting and traffic controlling tasks among 
mission phases within the national airspace environment is a prerequisite 
for planning research on or conducting an investigation of human error 
which employs fUll mission simulation. The importance of this prerequisite 
has been emphasized by the example of the approach and landing tasks at 
the end of Section III. Having thus identified at least some of the 
potential for human error among normal operations, we turn our attention in 
this section to the abnormal -- classification of the sources and dis-
tinguishing characteristics of error itself. 
Another prerequisite for planning and conducting research in any 
discipline is a set of accepted definitions. For example, such terms as 
defect, failure, reliability, unscheduled maintenance, and performance 
measurement have acquired disciplined meaning where applied to purely 
machinelike systems. An analogous glossary of terms is not yet widely 
accepted for analysis of human reliability and performance. In the next 
topic, therefore, we shall adopt several definitions of error already 
proposed and qualify the meaning of others. 
A. DEJ'm~ONS OF ERROR 
As we have already remarked, errors or mismatches be~ween desired and 
actual system or subsystem outputs are the sine qua non of situations where 
feedback is involved as an operating principle. Most of the time human 
operators use these errors to advantage in performing as error-correcting 
rather than error-avoiding system elements. For this reason in operations 
involving pilots, air crew, and ATC, the errors per se are of major concern 
only when they are undesirable because of their Size, timing, or character. 
These errors, which are intolerable in one way or another, we shall call 
grievouS errors. 
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In genera~, a grievous error will involve an exceedence of safe 
operating tolerances. IISystem error" and "system deviation, II terms used 
by the FAA Air Traffic Contro~ Service to describe procedur~ errors, 
missed acquisitions, and extreme deviations that ~ead to interactions 
between two aircraft, are grievous errors. These m2.y derive from mal,-
functions or fai~ures of system components which result in degraded system 
operation. llternative~y they may stem from the impact on a normally 
operating system of an unexpectedly severe forcing function or disturbance. 
This is an instance of what Singleton (Ref. 41) refers to as a substantive 
error, non-intended performance because the problem was inadequately 
defined at the outset, before the system requirements and specifications 
were establlshed, or the system design itself ~ms inadequate. 
Sin~eton also introduces the term fOrma~ error to apply to cases where 
some rule has been broken. Grievous errors in gener~ can be verified 
quantitatively because exceedences of to~erances can us~y be measured. 
On the other hand, transgressions of a rule may not necessari~y be observable 
or measurab~e, unless the rule specifies a commensurate tolerance. Out-
of-sequence performance (within tolerances otherwise) is an examp~e of 
transgression of a rule which might very l.ike~y be observab~e. 
The substantive and formal error c~ssifications are use~ in setting 
up a taxonomy of human error definitions. In genera~ human error == incon-
sistency with a predetermined behavioral nattern used in estab~ishing system 
requirements, speCifications, and the resulting design (Ref. 42) and in 
d~:rining the procedures to be used as well. Then, 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Formal (human) error == transgression of a rule, 
regulation, ~orithm (Refs. 41 and 43), or 
out-of-sequence perf'ormance (Ref. 44). 
Incoherent (human) error == non-required performance, 
Le., output not stimulated by an input (Ref. 44). 
Substantive (human) error = non-intended performance, 
e.g., because the procedure was inadequate~y defined. 
Human errors that do not always result in grievous errors may be near~y 
impossib~e to measure in practice unless behavior~ id~~tification techniques 
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are emp~oyed. Behavioral. identification may be performed by qualified 
observers (Refs. 24, 45, and 46) or by signal correlation analysis which 
can partition human error into coherent and incoherent components. Such 
identification of human errors which may be inconspicuous in one situation 
is very important, for they may lead to grievous errors in other 
circumstances. 
B. SOURCES Jm) CAUSES OF HmWi EImOR 
The functional. pathway triad and metacontro~er model for human behavior 
developed in Section III contains within its structure many features which 
can, in abnor.mal versions, lead to grievous system errors. These features 
we sh~ refer to as sOurces or antecedents of error. Sources are endogenous 
or internal. to the human. Their consequences are ~ measurable in terms 
of changes from ideal or nominal human behavior for a particular task. 
These changes may be induced by external (exogenous) factors which wi~ be 
referred to as causes of error. The first two columns of Table 9 illustrate 
these distinctions for compensatory operations. 
The remaining ~iO columns of Table 9 present a verbal syntheSis of 
a great deal of empirical data from many experimenters. All of the current-
ly demonstrated forms of abnormal compensatory input-output behavior are 
represented here. In total they represent an error source which can be 
described generally as 
inappropriate perception, deCision, and/or execution 
within a selected level (in this case, compensatory) 
of organization of behavior. 
The sources of error in this framework are summarized in Table 10. 
In princip~e tables similar to Table 9 can be constructed for the other 
source possibilities in Table 10, e.g., Tab~e 11 for pursuit operations. 
However the experimental data base for most of these is nowhere near as 
comprehensive as it is for the compensatory pathway. Many of the elements 
in the precognitive pathway can be developed, by ana~ogy, from Tab~e 1 
of Ref. 32, which lists the presumed sources of "slipS Il (or errors) in the 
structure of Fig. lOb. 
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TABLE 9 
BEHAVIORAL SOURCES OF ERROR m COMPENSATORY SYSTEMS 
SINGLE CIIANUEL OPERATIOII:l 
BASIC SOUllCE CA15ES OPERATOR DElIAVIOR EFFFl!T3 011 Sl:J~ (EtIOOGENOIll ) (EXOGEtIOl5 ) 
Extrema c<1lUllllnd or Unexpectedly large command Operator response normal System overloaded, forced out 
disturbance amplitudes or extreme environment of tolerance although 
operating properly 
Extreme cOlllllllUld or Broadband input signal noise; Regression of crossover Reduced system bandwidth 
disturbance bandwidth Unexpectedly broadband frequency 
disturbance 
Controlled-element Multunction/failure in Affecting output for Transient errors during tran-
change controlled el"ment transient interval; sition; 
Adaptation to new controlled Reduced system bandwidth 
element 
Reduced attention Poor slgnal/nolse ratio Operator tbreshold, net galn System bandwidth reduction; 
rield (e.g., poor contrast, high reduction (missed Signals as one 
intensity distraction extreme) 
stimuli, low level signals, 
etc.) 
Reversals Misper~eption of error ~; Remnant increase, Increased system noise; 
tlaivete Int"rmittently reversed Intermittently reversed system 
output output 
NUI.TI-IN1'lfr OPERATIOW 
BAS IC SOUIlCE CA15~ OPERATOR BElIAVIOR EJo'FFl!T3 011 Sl:JTEH (ElIDOGElI015 ) (EXOGElIOl5 ) 
--
Divided attention, Increased informatIonal Remnant increase (scanning), Increased system noise, 
perceptual scanning requirements for monitoring Increase in loop gains. Reduced bandwidth 
or control Simultaneolls multi-channel 
operations 
Information overload: As above, plllS failure to Saturation, 
Too many separate input detect somo signals, Missed responses, 
cbannels, increased latencies, and Instability in the mean square 
Too many significant signals, missed output responses sense 
Backlog of unattended 
opera tions 
Reduced attentional Operator impalnoent (fatigue, Remnant lnCrC8.9C over seaMing; Increased system noise 
field alcohol, hypoxia, etc.) Further decrease in loop gain, Reduced bandwidths 
llequenUaUy-switched single Increased latencies 
channel operations, 
Deletion/missed responses Hissed rcsponse3 
Illusior~, kinetosis Conflict between or umong ltenulUnt increase j Increased system noise 
visual, vestIbular, aural, Dccr~ase in opera tor's sain i Redu~ed bandwidth 
kines th., lie and/or pro- Hal a propos responses, ~bl a propos responses 
1,l'iocepUve input" Hissed responses Hbsed responses 
-
- - .. -----~---- ---- .. -
TABLE 10 
SOURCES OF HUMAN ERROR 
(Sources are endogenous or internal to the human operator by definition) 
Inappropriate perception, decision, and/or execution within 
a selected level of behavioral organization 
Compensatory (expanded in Table 9) 
Pursuit (expanded in Table 11) 
Precognitive (expanded in Table 1 of Ref. 32) 
Selection of response unit 
Execution of response 
Transitions from a higher to lower level of behavioral 
organization 
Precognitive to pursuit 
Precognitive to compensatory 
Pursuit to compensatory 
Inappropriate organization of perception and behavior for the 
task at the executive level of the metacontroller 
(Expanded in Table 12 for the cockpit environment) 
(Expanded in Tabie 13 for the traff'ic control environment) 
Inadequate off-line monitor/supervisor in the metacontroller 
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BASIC SOURCE 
(UIDOGENOUS ) 
Controlled element 
chunge 
Divided attention, 
perceptual scanning 
Reduced attentional 
fi~ld in spatial 
dimensions 
Reduced attentional 
field in temporal 
dimension, i.e., 
reduced preview 
Reversals 
Illusions, kinetosis 
TABLE 11 
BEHAVIORAL SOURCES OF ERROR IN PURSUIT OPERATIONS 
(Multi-Input Operations, by Definition) 
CAUSES 
(EXOGENOUS ) 
(sec corresponding causes in 
Table 9) 
(see corresponding causes 
in Table 9) 
Poor input and/or error 
signal/noise ratio (e.g., 
inabil1ty to identity input.) 
Task involves disturbance 
regulation rather than com-
mand-following and distur-
bance cannot be identified; 
Mismatched scaling between 
input and error; 
Distortion of input; 
Lack of. input conformability 
with visual field; 
See also corresponding causes 
in Table 9 
Inahility to identify ~ 
input or disturbance; 
Prodigious extrapolation 
required to estimate ~ 
input or disturbance 
Perceptual inversion of input; 
l<'aulty input-background dis-
crilllination; 
Lack of input conformability 
with visual field 
(see corresponding causes in 
'fable 9) 
OPERATOR BEHAVIOR 
Transient regression to com-
pensatory level (see 
corresponding behavior in 
Table 9) 
Remnant increase; 
Decrease in operator's gain; 
(see also corresponding 
behavior in Table 9) 
Remnant increase; 
Operator's threshold on input 
may cause missed responses 
and regression to compensa-
tory level; 
Operator's thresllOld on error 
may reduce gain in or open 
compensatory loop 
(see also corresponding 
behavior in Table 9) 
As above, plus increased 
latencies 
Remnant increase; 
IntermittenUy reversed 
output 
Remnant increase; 
Decr~ase in operator's gain; 
Mal a propos responses; 
Missed responses 
EFFECTS Oll SYSTEM 
Transient errors during 
transition; 
Reduced system bandwidth 
Increased system noise; 
Reduced bandwidth; 
(see also corresponding 
effects in Table 9) 
Increased system noise; 
Reduced system bandwidth 
(missed responses as one 
extreme) 
As above, plus increased 
response latencies 
Increased system noise; 
IntermlttenUy reversed 
output 
Increased system noise; 
Reduyed bandwidth; 
Mal a propos responses; 
Missed responses 
,~ 
~LE 12 
CAUSES OF ERROR LEADTIrG TO INAPPROPRIATE ORGANIZATION 
OF PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR AT THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL OF THE 
METACONTROLLER nr THE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT 
Items 1-5 are associated with the "situation identification" block 
in Fig. lOa 
Item 6 is associated with the "selection of appropriate pathway(s)" 
in Fig. lOa 
Errors in: 
(1) Formulation of intent, assigrument of function (to crew member 
by captain) and its priority 
Tactical Decisions (assignment retained by captain 
with rare exceptions) 
CN! 
Systems Operation 
Flight Control 
(2) Identification of specific taSk/Situation/action: continuous 
or discrete 
Information retrieval. (e. g., checklists, clearance, ins truc-
tions, manuals, maps, SIDs, STARs, approach plates) 
Conferring to arrive at a decision 
Monitoring 
controlling/commanding 
Command~Interpretation and transcription (e.g., clearance, etc.) 
COIll!llaIld-following (e. g., flying) 
Disturbance regulation 
Deferring action (changing priority) 
Reassignment of action (to a different creTN' member by captain) 
(3a) Selection of likel.y sources of information and their temporal 
order (i.e., stale, current, or preview) 
TR-1156-1 
Checklists, clearances, instructions, manuals, maps, SIDs, 
STARs, approach plates 
Voice advisory or command 
Visual field 
Relevant instruments/displays/annunicators 
Motion cues 
Proprioceptive cues 
(continued on next page) 
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TABIE 12 (Concluded) 
Errors in: 
(3b) Assignment of priority in sources of information among inputs, 
feedbacks 
Specific IFR sources 
Specific VFR sources 
Type of display: compensatory, pursuit, preview' 
(4) Identifying predictability or coherence in and among sources 
of information 
Patterns in random COI!lIIla.l1ds, disturbances - nil 
Patterns in wind shears - may be highly correlated 
Patterns in programmed commands, maneuvers 
Patterns in periOdiC commands, disturbances 
Patterns in discrete commands, disturbances, failures 
Patterns in slowly divergent or ramp-like disturbances, 
failures 
(5) Identifying familiarity with task 
Nil 
Slight 
Moderate 
Great, i.e., very well rehearsed 
(6) Organizing operation on inputs, feedbacks: 
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Continuous or discrete operations 
SOP level: compensatory, pursuit, precognitive, combinations 
Loop structure 
Behavioral adaptation within loop structure 
Specific cued (behavioral) programs 
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TABLE: 13 
CAUSES OF ERROR LEADlNG TO INAPPROPRIATE ORGAUlZATION 
OF PERCEPTION MID BEHAVIOR AT THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL OF THE 
METACONTROLLER IN THE TRA..'li'FIC CONTROL ENVIRONNENT 
Items 1-5 are associated with the "situation identification" block 
in Fig. lOa 
Item 6 is associated with the "selection of appropriate pathway(s)1I 
in Fig. lOa 
Errors in: 
(1) For.mulation of intent, assignment of function (to specialist 
by supervisor) and its priority 
ATC: Enroute, termina.l. (departure, approach), 
final, surface 
Commercial: Aircraft dispatcher, ramp control. super-
visor, area operations supervisor, 
operations controller 
(2) Identification of specific task/situation/action: continuous 
or discrete 
Information retrieval 
Communication input 
Conferring to arrive at a decision 
Surveillance, searching, pattern recognition 
Monitoring 
Tracking 
Controlling/commanding/advising/interrogating 
(communication output) 
Deferring action 
Reassignment of action (to a different specialist) 
(3a) Selection of likely sources of information and their temporal 
order (i.e., stale, current, or preview) 
Visual: Flight pro~ess posting strips/ETABS 
FPI/ ATCRBS (DABS 
Aural communications 
(3b) Assignment of priority in sources of information among inputs, 
feedbacks 
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Specific visual. sources 
Specific aural sources 
Type of display: compensatory, pursuit, previe';.T 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 13 (Concluded) 
Errors in: 
(~) Identifying predictability or coherence in and among sources 
o:t: information 
Patterns in programmed tracks on PFr 
Patterns in predicted courses on PFr 
Patterns in programmed altitude responses 
Patterns in predicted altitude responses 
Patterns in overall :t:light progress 
Patterns in discrete commands, disturbances, :t:ailures 
Patterns in sl.owly divergent or ramp-like disturbances, 
:t:ail.ures 
Coherence in aural communications 
Inter:t:erence in aural communic"a tions 
(5) Identifying :t:a.miliari ty with task 
Nil. 
Slight 
Moderate 
Great, i.e., very well rehearsed 
(6) Organizing operation on inputs, :t:eedbacks 
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Continuous or discrete operations 
SOP level: compensatory, pursuit, precognitive, 
combinations 
Loop structure 
Behavioral adaptation within loop structure 
Specific cued (behavioral) programs (e.g., conflict 
alert and col1ision avoidance command) 
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Transitions from higher to lower levels occur when the attentional 
field becomes too narrow. They can also occur when the human is sufficiently 
impaired perceptually (i.e., by alcohol, fatigue, hypoxia, etc.) so that 
action as a multi-channel operator is significantly degraded. In these 
instances divided attention is possible only by switching to and fro as an 
essentially single channel information processing device. 
Although probably one of the most :fundamental sources of human error, 
the inappropriate organization of perception and behavior for the task at 
the executive level of the metacontroller has received much less attention 
in the literature than have inappropriate perception, decision, and/or 
execution within a selected level of behavioral organization. The SOP 
theory described in Section III offers a unifying approach to inappropriate 
o'l"geni zati on as a source of human error. To illustrate this source more 
specifically, we have partitioned possible causes of error leading to 
inappropriate organization of perception and behavior in two contexts, 
the cockpit environment and the traffic control environment. (There are 
actually two traffic control environments, one operated by the Federal 
Aviation Administration, the other, peculiar to each commercial operator. 
For the purpose of classifying these causes of error among traffic control-
lers, however, one list will suffice; the other list will serve the cOCkpit.) 
Table 12 presents the partition for the cockpit, and Table 13, for the 
traffic control environment. Within each subdivision, specific examples 
are listed to help in understanding the meaning of the subdivision. 
This concludes our subdivision of the causes of error. Next we shall 
consider the assignment of causes and some remedial actions. 
C. A~ION OF ElmOR (ASSIGm!EmT OF 
CAUSE OR RES?ONSIBILIfi FOR ERROR) 
Singleton, in Ref. 41, identifies significant problems in addressing 
scientifically the issue of assigning responsibility for error. 
"Most societies have not resolved the distinction be~ween 
two main approaches (to attribution). One assumes that 
human beings are responsible for their own actions and are 
therefore responsible for the errors they make. The opposite 
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view is that errors are an inherent component in a.l.l human 
performance, that they should be planned for and designed 
for and when they do occur the fault should be traced to 
the system deSigner rather than the operator. At the 
individual level, few people are suf'ficiently self-confident 
to deliberately acknowledge their own mistakes, particularly 
if there are financial consequences in doing so. This is 
an especially difficult problem in the insurance world, 
where accidents are investigated with a view to deciding 
who is going to pay for the damage caused either to people 
or to property. In such a situation it is not surprising 
to find that it is im@ossible to regard the evidence as 
scientific in any sense." 
One of the prime justifications for the study of full mission operations 
in the Man Vehicle Systems Research Facility is to avoid these problems 
grace~. Another way is to sidestep the issue of attribution in order 
to acquire incipient and consUIlI!Ila.te error data ~Ti th a semblance of 
scientific credibility. The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (Ref. 47) 
is a prime example of a confidential, non-punitive program designed to 
sidestep the issue of attribution in the process of acquiring a scientifi-
cally usef'ul. error data base. 
No~Nithstanding the aforementioned problems, we believe that there 
may be useful ways to classify the assignment of causes of error in an 
impersonal way which has scientific value. Such a classification is 
presented in Table 14. The subdivisions of attribution shown there were 
selected so that they could be identified with constructive remedial 
action. Examples of such remedies are listed on the right hand side of 
the table. Some of these, e.g., skill development and continuing rehearsal 
for proficiency maintenance, have been discussed thoroughly in Sections II 
and III. 
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T A B L E  1 4  
P A R T I T I O N S  O F  A T T R I B U T I O N  A N D  R E M E D Y  
A ' l ' T R I B l 1 1 ' I O I f  
A s s i g n m e n t  a t  C a u s e s  a t  E r r o r "  
•  I l I I L d e ' l u a t e  d c f i n l t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  a t  t h o  o u t s e t  b e t o r o  
t h e  ~yst"lII r e q u l r e m e n t s  a n d  s p e c l t i c a t i o n s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  
( P 1 ' o < 1 u c e o  s u b s t a n t i v e  o r  e x i s t e n t i a l  e r r o r ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  
s y s t e m  s p e c l f i c a t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  i ' l A d c < j u a t e )  o t h e r w i s  . .  c a l l e d  
" w l f o r e u e e n  c 1 r c w n s  t a n c e s . "  
•  l l l l l d e q u a t e  s ) ' l I t e m  d e s i g n  ( p r e s u m e s  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  
a d e q u a t e ,  b u t  t h e l r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  t e r l l l S  o f  t h e  d e s i g n  
I s  n o t  a d e q u a t e ,  t h e r e f o r e  a l s o  pr~luces s u b s t a n t i v e  
e r r o r .  )  
•  I l l l L d e q u a t e  d e t i n l t l o n  o t  U , e  p r o c e d u r e s  ( r e a l l y  p a r t  a t  
s y s t e m  d e s i g n ,  b u t  c m p h a s i z e s  m o d u s  o p e r a n d i  a n d  t h e r e t o r e  
a l s o  p r o d u c e s  s u b s t a n t l v e  e r r o r )  
•  Nulvet~ 
/ . l 1 s m a t c h e d  o r  m i s a p p l 1 e d  s k i l l s .  
I g n o r u n c e  o f  r e g u l A t i o n s  o r  r u l e s  
I n u d e q u a t e  i n s t r u c t i o n  o t  t h e  p r o c e d u r e s  
•  II~dequate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a n d / o r  e x e c u t i o n  o t  t h e  p r o c e d u r e ( s )  
l A p s e  i n  p r a c t i c e  
p~ychophysiological a t r e s s o r a  
( 1 )  W o r k l o a d  
( 2 )  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  d i s o r d e r s  
( , )  E m o t i o n a l  d i s o r d e r s  
( I f )  A l c o l w l ,  d r u g s  
P s y c h o n e u r o s i s  
UhUld~rs - e v e r y o n e  i n v o l v e d  t h i n k s  t h a t  e v e r y t h i n g  i s  o k a y  
w h e n  i t  I s n ' t .  
E x t e r n a l  d l s t u r b a n c e s  ( i . e . ,  e x t e r n a l  t o  t h e  h u m a n  o p e r a t a r ) ,  e . g . ,  
w l u d  a h o b . r  
p u t e n t i a l  t r a t t i c  c o n t l 1 c t s  
rullure~ o f  t h e  m a c h l n  . .  o r  s y s t e r a  
1 1 , e  . .  l>~"lIc" 0 1 '  I I s s i g n a b l e  CIIU~C ~a.rlS t h a t  th~ e r r o r  v i l l  b e  c a l l e d  " c h a n c e "  o r  " r a n d o m . " .  
R E M E D Y  
C o r r e c t i o n  o t  C a u s e  
•  D e s i g n  m o d i t i c a t i o n  
•  D e s i g n  m o d i f i c a t i o n  
•  P r o c e d u r a l  m o d i t i c a t i o n  
•  (Na1vet~) 
S e l e c t i o n  a n d  t r a i n i n g  t o r  s k i l l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
E x p l a n a t i o n  a n d  t r a i n i n g  
R e  t r a i n i n g  a n d  r e h e a r s a l  
•  ( I n a d e q u a t e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a n d / o r  e x e c u t i o n  o t  t . h e  p r o c e d u r e ( s »  
C o n t I n u i n g  r e h e a r s a l  f o r  p r o f i c i e n c y  m a i n t e n a n c e  
( P s y c h o p h y s i o l o g i c a l  s t r e s s o r s )  
( 1 )  R e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s o m e  f U n c t i o n s  o r  t a s k s  a m o n g  c r e v  
m e m b e r s  o r  r e a s s i g n m e n t  o f  s o m e  f U n c t i o n s  t o  t l U t o m a t i c  
c o n t r o l  
( 2 )  C o r r e c t i o n  o r  r e a s s i g n m e n t  
( , )  R ; : o o s i g n l l l e n t ,  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
( 4 )  R e a s s I g n m e n t ,  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  
R e a s s i g n m e n t ,  r e l l A b l l 1 t u t i o n  
R e q u i l ' e s  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  o b s e r v e r  o r  a g e n c y  t o  l I l O n l t o r ,  r e c o 0 1 i z e ,  
a n d  c o r r e c t .  
J M 3 I g n  m o d i t l c a t i o n  t o  s c n s e  t h e  d h t u r b l l n c e ,  i t  p o s s i b l e ,  s o  t h 1 l t  
t h e  o p e r u t a r  C a n  a d o p t  p u r s u i t  o r  p r e c o 0 1 i t i v e  l e v e l s  o f  b e h a v i o r  
t o  c o p e  I d t h  t h e  d l s t u r b u n c e  w h e r e  t h e  c o m p e n s u t o r y  l e v e l  i s  
i n u p p r o p r i u t e ;  d e s i g n  m o d l f i c a t i o n  t a  i m p r o v e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o t  U , e  
.~chlne, p o s s l b l y  e v e n  b y  r e l l s s i g n m e n t  o t  s o m e  fUnctIon~ t o  a  h u m a n  
o p e r a t o r  n o t  o t h e r w I s e  o v e r l o a d e d .  
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APPENDIX B 
ADAPTIVE PSYCHOMOTOR AND COGNITIVE TASKS FOR MEASURING 
EXCESS CONTROL CAPACITY 
(From Refs. B-1, B-2, and B-3) 
The considerable pilot rating data available in Ref. B-4 for the 
estimation of handling qualities indicate that, where closed-loop com-
pensatory tracking is the task, the pilot's increments in rating are 
indeed based on the relative difficulty with which he obtains and main-
tains the specified performance. This notion that among the causal 
factors of pilot rating are the pilot's attempts to maintain performance 
by working to control in spite of the increasing difficulty was further 
supported by an experiment which measured a parameter uniquely related 
to excess control capacity (Ref. B-4). 
A secondary tracking task* was used to "load" the pilot so that his 
performance on the primary task began to deteriorate. A block diagram 
of these tasks is shown in Fig. B-1. The difficulty of the secondary 
task was made proportional to primary task performance. Thus when the 
pilot was keeping primary task error performance less than a criterion 
value, E, the secondary task difficulty was automatically increased by 
increasing the rate of divergence of the secondary instability. Con-
versely, when the pilot was so busy with the secondary task that primary 
error was larger than the criterion value, the secondary task difficulty 
automatically decreased. The final stationary level of secondary diffi-
culty was determined by the sensitivity of the primary task performance 
to loading. The final "score" is Ax' the stationary value of the 
secondary unstable pole (A) in rad/sec. The scores obtained from this 
cross-coupled secondary task represent its degree of difficulty; 
* The adjective "subcritical" implies that 0 < A < AC' where A is the 
"critical" upper bound at which the human operator loses control of the 
secondary task instability with no primary task. A is a function of 
the operator's effective time delay in tracking, whIch is the analog of 
the operator's discrete reaction time delay or latency. 
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,-----, 
Input - Primary Error I I CI YP1 Y1 
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Figure B-1. Elements of the Cross-Coupled Instability Task (CClT) 
(From Ref. B-5) 
consequently, they also represent the "degree of ease" of the primary 
task or the excess control capacity available with respect to the 
primary task. 
ADAPTING THE CROSS-COUPLED SUBCRITICAL PSYCHOMOTOR 
TASK FOR A SPECIFIC CONTEXT 
Referring again to Fig. B-1, notice that a given primary task or 
ensemble is monitored for task performance error, Which is allowed by 
criterion E to grow not more than 10 to 30 percent over the unloaded 
performance error, measured at the beginning of each run to normalize 
effects of skill, learning, and individual variations from session to 
session. Special filtering and trend circuits detect When the unloaded 
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primary task performance error is stable, at which point the unloaded 
rms performance error (ae ) is logged for later use, and the cross-
coupling activated. A plausible secondary task in the operator~s pri-
* mary task context is simulated with a firs~-order-instability whose 
level is slowly increased as long as the smoothed primary task error is 
less than the "error-increase criterion" (E = loaded rms error/unloaded 
rms error, where 1.1 < E < 1.3). As the actual primary task error ratio 
increase approaches E, the slow growth in the cross-coupled instability 
becomes asymptotic and its average is scored as the cross-coupled-limit, 
Ax. The "Excess Control Capacity," EC (an index of workload margin) is 
found by dividing Ax by Ac' the subjects~ critical instability score for 
the same session, using the secondary task control and display with no 
primary task: 
EC A /A I x c 
same Ss, session, task 
(B-1) 
As previously established, ~ is an inverse measure of the fraction 
of time the operator can spend away from the primary task; thus it is a 
direct measure of excess control capacity. Normalizing by the individ-
ual concurrent level of Ac makes the EC score truly representative of 
workload margin and not just skill in secondary task tracking. Refer-
ence B-S describes the development of this task, the detailed operation, 
and a series of experiments which validate the assumption that the 
primary task behavior is not changed in form and by only a small and 
controlled degree. 
Individual measurements of excess control capacity for each of two 
or more primary tasks can be combined by a multiplication process 
(Ref. B-6) to estimate the combined value of EC which would be measured 
* The adjustable first order instability can serve as a surrogate for 
either an integration or an instability in the equations describing the 
controlled element. 
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if all of the given "primary" tasks were performed in concert. The 
combined value of EC is given by the product of the individual values of 
EC: 
n 
(EC) ... 
n IT (EC)i (B-2) 
This empirical "product rule" has been valida ted with mre extensive 
multiaxis Cooper-Harper rating data in Ref. B-7. In effect, the product 
rule results in the physically satisfying vector addition of individual 
and combined fractional values of EC, regardless of the number of 
"primary" tasks. 
For an overall figure of performance, we sometimes calculate a 
Performance Penalty index, P, which combines the input-normalized error 
with the inverse of excess control capacity (call it workload 
index :: A I A) 
c x 
Where P ~ 
a a 
e 
a ... i 
A • c 
A 
-x 
P 
a A 
e c 
- a-+T 
i x 
Performance Penalty 
rms unloaded error 
rms input 
critical instability with no primary task 
cross-coupled instability 
(B-3) 
Since ael d d l ~ I d d < E, the normalized error criterion, a better oa e un oa e 
tracker can still achieve a lower penalty index P even if the workload 
index is comparable among SSe 
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ADAPTING A CROSS-COUPLED COGNITIVE TASK 
FOR A SPECIFIC CONTEXT 
Another type of secondary task ___ this one discrete ___ has higher 
face validity in terms of cognitive monitoring, processing, and 
acknowledging an advisory message rather than performing continuous 
psychomotor activity for the purpose of control. The discrete secondary 
advisory stimulus can be communicated visually or aurally. (If visual, 
the advisory stimulus is usually outside the foveal field of the primary 
task display.) 
The fundamental measure of the operator's reserve cognitive capacity 
with respect to the primary task is proportional to the operator's 
average response time latency (RT) to an ensemble of the secondary 
advisory stimuli. Various types of latency can be measured, e.g., 
simple reaction time (Refs. B-8 through B-11), disjunctive or choice 
reaction time (Refs. B-8, B-9, B-12, and B-13), or compound choice 
* reaction time (Refs. B-14 through B-17). The measure of excess cogni-
tive capacity is usually interpreted as (RT)o/(RT)L' where (RT)o is the 
operator's average response latency to the secondary advisory stimuli 
while the operator is concentrating solely on the secondary task (i.e., 
not performing the primary task(s» and (RT)L is the operator's average 
* Commonly called the "Sternberg item recognition time." The Sternberg 
short-term memory task is an information processing task designed to 
assess cognitive reserve capacity under primary task loading conditions. 
The operator memorizes designated "critical" sets of N items wilere N is 
an integer> 0 (e.g., N specific letters, numbers, words, or symbolic 
characters) which are selected beforehand from a larger sample space. 
Items which are not members of the critical set are, by definition, 
"non-critical." Adisplayed item, chosen at random from the sample 
space is communicated to the operator visually or aurally to serve as 
the stimulus. The operator has to identify the item as "critical" or 
"non-critical" and provide the appropriate discrete response, usually by 
means of a two-way switch, within a prescribed time limit. Responses 
are recorded and evaluated in terms of latency and correctness. The 
average response time latency, RT(N), is a linear function of N. In-
creases in the slope of the Sternberg function [RT(N) versus NJ are a 
measure of higher cognitive loads imposed by concurrent primary tasks. 
Increases in the extrapolated intercept of the Sternberg function as N 
o are a measure of higher perceptual motor loads imposed by concurrent 
primary tasks. 
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loaded response latency to the secondary advisory stimuli while the 
operator is performing the primary task(s). 
Usually, although not necessarily, in the use of this type of 
secondary task, one presents a subsequent advisory stimulus to the 
operator as soon as the previous one is responded to. The operator is 
nevertheless instructed to regard a particular task or set of (other) 
tasks as "primary" and to respond to the designated secondary advisory 
stimulus only if the operator believes he can do so without compromising 
his performance on the primary task(s). The intent of this instruction, 
of course, is to minimize int~rference with or "loading" of the primary 
task. In practice, however, a definite loading of the primary task 
occurs. Such loading may be constrained and regulated by cross-coupling 
the average presentation or generation rate of the secondary advisory 
stimuli to a measure of primary task performance in the manner of 
Fig. B-2, which combines the methods of Refs. B-5 and B-18. 
Figure B-2 is analogous to Fig. B-1, except for the difference in 
the type of secondary task and the fact that the cross-coupling signal, 
Ay' is the average random character generation rate in Fig. B-2 instead 
of the instability level, Ax' in Fig. B-1. The reciprocal of Ay (l/Ay) 
is therefore the mean time bet~en secondary task advisory stimuli. 
Consequently llAy subsumes the operator~s average response time latency, 
RT, and includes any additional latency which is necessary to prevent 
loading the primary task beyond the error increase criterion, E. As the 
actual primary task error ratio increase approaches E, the slow growth 
in character generation rate, Ay' becomes asymptotic and its average 
value is scored. The "EXcess Cognitive Capac! ty," XC (an index of 
workload margin), is found by dividing Ay by Ao' the asymptotic value of 
A for the same session, using the secondary advisory task and display 
with no primary task: 
XC A fA I 
y 0 same Ss, session. task 
(B-4) 
TR-1l56-2 B-6 
l' 
, 
'.~ 
~ 
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Figure B-2. A Cross-Coupled Adaptive Cognitive Task 
ulus 
te Ay 
* The algorithm for enabling the random character generator can be as follows: 
Character generator initially off. 
Compute h • AyTF where Ay is average stimulus generation rate from the 
cross-coupling algorithm, which includes average primary task error(s) 
and average secondary task response time. TF is computation frame time 
Each computation frame generates (from a uniform probability distribution) 
a random number (x) with 0 < x < 1 such that 
if 0 < x < h, enable the character generator 
if h < x < 1, make no change in the state of the character 
generator; recompute h and recycle the test on h. 
If the character generator is enabled, disable the above test on hand 
measure the time until the operator's response is received or until the 
time limit expires, whichever is less. Weight incorrect responses with a 
penalty proportional to the time limit. 
When a response is made by the operator, disable the character generator. 
If the response is correct, recompute h and recycle the test on h. 
If the response is missed or is incorrect, wait until the time limit or 
penalized time limit expires before recomputing h and recycling the test 
on h. 
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Alternatively one may, as in Ref. B-18, calculate an overall 
performance measure which combines the unloaded primary input-normalized 
error with the excess cognitive capacity as the quotient, 
Q - ~)/~~) (B-S) 
Again, since ae 1 d d/ae 1 d d < E, the normalized error criterion, un oa e un oa e 
a lower primary error will be reflected in a higher Quotient, Q, even.if 
the excess cognitive capacity is comparable among SSe 
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